

Logik für Informatiker

Logic for computer scientists

Quantifiers

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Motivating examples

$\forall x \text{ Cube}(x)$ (“All objects are cubes.”)

$\forall x (\text{Cube}(x) \rightarrow \text{Large}(x))$ (“All cubes are large.”)

$\forall x \text{ Large}(x)$ (“All objects are large.”)

$$\exists x \text{ Cube}(x)$$

“There exists a cube.”

$$\exists x (\text{Cube}(x) \wedge \text{Large}(x))$$

“There exists a large cube.”

The four Aristotelian forms

All P's are Q's. $\forall x(P(x) \rightarrow Q(x))$

Some P's are Q's. $\exists x(P(x) \wedge Q(x))$

No P's are Q's. $\forall x(P(x) \rightarrow \neg Q(x))$

Some P's are not Q's. $\exists x(P(x) \wedge \neg Q(x))$

Note:

$\forall x(P(x) \rightarrow Q(x))$ does not imply that there are some P 's.

$\exists x(P(x) \wedge Q(x))$ does not imply that not all P 's are Q 's.

First-order signatures

A **first-order signature** consists of

- a set of **predicate symbols** with arities, like $Smaller^{(2)}$, $Dodec^{(1)}$, $Between^{(3)}$, $\leq^{(2)}$, including propositional symbols (nullary predicate symbols), like $A^{(0)}$, $B^{(0)}$, $C^{(0)}$, (written **uppercase**)
- its **names** or **constants** for individuals, like a, b, c , (written **lowercase**)
- its **function symbols** with arities, like $f^{(1)}$, $+^{(2)}$, $\times^{(2)}$.

Usually, arities are omitted.

In the book, the terminology “language” is used.

“Signature” is more precise, since it exactly describes the ingredients that are needed to generate a (first-order) language.

Terms

$t ::= a$	constant
$t ::= x$	variable
$ f^{(n)}(t_1, \dots, t_n)$	application of function symbols to terms

Usually, arities are omitted.

Variables are: t, u, v, w, x, y, z , possibly with subscripts.

Well-formed formulas

$F ::= p^{(n)}(t_1, \dots, t_n)$	application of predicate symbols
\perp	contradiction
$\neg F$	negation
$(F_1 \wedge \dots \wedge F_n)$	conjunction
$(F_1 \vee \dots \vee F_n)$	disjunction
$(F_1 \rightarrow F_2)$	implication
$(F_1 \leftrightarrow F_2)$	equivalence
$\forall \nu F$	universal quantification
$\exists \nu F$	existential quantification

The variable ν is said to be **bound** in $\forall \nu F$ and $\exists \nu F$.

Parentheses

The outermost parentheses of a well-formed formula can be omitted:

$$Cube(x) \wedge Small(x)$$

In general, parentheses are important to determine the scope of a quantifier (see next slide).

Free and bound variables

An occurrence of a variable in a formula that is not bound is said to be **free**.

$\exists y \text{ LeftOf}(x, y)$	x is free, y is bound
$(\text{Cube}(x) \wedge \text{Small}(x)) \rightarrow \exists y \text{ LeftOf}(x, y)$	x is free, y is bound
$\exists x (\text{Cube}(x) \wedge \text{Small}(x))$	Both occurrences of x are bound
$\exists x \text{ Cube}(x) \wedge \text{Small}(x)$	The first occurrence of x is bound, the second one is free

Sentences

A **sentence** is a well-formed formula without free variables.

$$\perp \qquad A \wedge B$$

$$Cube(a) \vee Tet(b)$$

$$\forall x (Cube(x) \rightarrow Large(x))$$

$$\forall x ((Cube(x) \wedge Small(x)) \rightarrow \exists y LeftOf(x, y))$$

Semantics of quantification

We need to fix some **domain of discourse**.

$\forall x S(x)$ is true iff for **every** object in the domain of discourse with name n , $S(n)$ is true.

$\exists x S(x)$ is true iff for **some** object in the domain of discourse with name n , $S(n)$ is true.

Not all objects need to have names — hence we assume that for objects, names n_1, n_2, \dots can be invented “on the fly”.

The game rules

FORM	YOUR COMMITMENT	PLAYER TO MOVE	GOAL
$P \vee Q$	TRUE	you	Choose one of P, Q that is true.
	FALSE	Tarski's World	
$P \wedge Q$	TRUE	Tarski's World	Choose one of P, Q that is false.
	FALSE	you	
$\exists x P(x)$	TRUE	you	Choose some b that satisfies the wff $P(x)$.
	FALSE	Tarski's World	
$\forall x P(x)$	TRUE	Tarski's World	Choose some b that does not satisfy $P(x)$.
	FALSE	you	

Logical consequence for quantifiers

$\forall x(\text{Cube}(x) \rightarrow \text{Small}(x))$

$\forall x \text{Cube}(x)$

$\forall x \text{Small}(x)$

$\forall x \text{Cube}(x)$

$\forall x \text{Small}(x)$

$\forall x(\text{Cube}(x) \wedge \text{Small}(x))$

However: ignoring quantifiers does not work!

$\exists x(\text{Cube}(x) \rightarrow \text{Small}(x))$

$\exists x \text{Cube}(x)$

$\exists x \text{Small}(x)$

$\exists x \text{Cube}(x)$

$\exists x \text{Small}(x)$

$\exists x(\text{Cube}(x) \wedge \text{Small}(x))$

Tautologies do not distribute over quantifiers

$$\exists x \text{ Cube}(x) \vee \exists x \neg \text{Cube}(x)$$

is a logical truth, but

$$\forall x \text{ Cube}(x) \vee \forall x \neg \text{Cube}(x)$$

is not. By contrast,

$$\forall x \text{ Cube}(x) \vee \neg \forall x \text{ Cube}(x)$$

is a tautology.

Truth-functional form

Replace all top-level quantified sub-formulas (i.e. those not occurring below another quantifier) by propositional letters.

Replace multiple occurrences of the same sub-formula by the same propositional letter.

A quantified sentence of FOL is said to be a tautology iff its truth-functional form is a tautology.

$$\forall x \text{ Cube}(x) \vee \neg \forall x \text{ Cube}(x)$$

becomes

$$A \vee \neg A$$

Truth functional form — examples

FO sentence	t.f. form
$\forall x \text{Cube}(x) \vee \neg \forall x \text{Cube}(x)$	$A \vee \neg A$
$(\exists y \text{Tet}(y) \wedge \forall z \text{Small}(z)) \rightarrow \forall z \text{Small}(z)$	$(A \wedge B) \rightarrow B$
$\forall x \text{Cube}(x) \vee \exists y \text{Tet}(y)$	$A \vee B$
$\forall x \text{Cube}(x) \rightarrow \text{Cube}(a)$	$A \rightarrow B$
$\forall x (\text{Cube}(x) \vee \neg \text{Cube}(x))$	A
$\forall x (\text{Cube}(x) \rightarrow \text{Small}(x)) \vee \exists x \text{Dodec}(x)$	$A \vee B$

Examples of \rightarrow -Elim

$\exists x(\text{Cube}(x) \rightarrow \text{Small}(x))$	A	No!
$\exists x \text{Cube}(x)$	B	
$\exists x \text{Small}(x)$	C	

$\exists x \text{Cube}(x) \rightarrow \exists x \text{Small}(x)$	$A \rightarrow B$	Yes!
$\exists x \text{Cube}(x)$	A	
$\exists x \text{Small}(x)$	B	

Tautologies and logical truths

Every tautology is a logical truth, but not vice versa.


Example: $\exists x \text{Cube}(x) \vee \exists x \neg \text{Cube}(x)$

is a logical truth, but not a tautology.

Similarly, every tautologically valid argument is a logically valid argument, but not vice versa.

$$\left| \begin{array}{l} \forall x \text{Cube}(x) \\ \hline \exists x \text{Cube}(x) \end{array} \right.$$

is a logically valid argument, but not tautologically valid.



Tautologies and logical truths, cont'd

Propositional logic	First-order logic	Tarski' World	General notion
<i>Tautology</i>	<i>FO validity</i>	<i>TW validity</i>	<i>Logical Truth</i>
<i>Tautological consequence</i>	<i>FO consequence</i>	<i>TW consequence</i>	<i>Logical consequence</i>
<i>Tautological equivalence</i>	<i>FO equivalence</i>	<i>TW equivalence</i>	<i>Logical equivalence</i>

Which ones are FO validities?

$$\forall x \text{ SameSize}(x, x)$$

$$\forall x \text{ Cube}(x) \rightarrow \text{Cube}(b)$$

$$(\text{Cube}(b) \wedge b = c) \rightarrow \text{Cube}(c)$$

$$(\text{Small}(b) \wedge \text{SameSize}(b, c)) \rightarrow \text{Small}(c)$$

Replacement method: Replace predicates by meaningless ones

$$\begin{aligned} & \forall x \text{ Outgrabe}(x, x) \\ & \forall x \text{ Tove}(x) \rightarrow \text{Tove}(b) \\ & (\text{Tove}(b) \wedge b = c) \rightarrow \text{Tove}(c) \\ & (\text{Slithy}(b) \wedge \text{Outgrabe}(b, c)) \rightarrow \text{Slithy}(c) \end{aligned}$$

Is this a valid FO argument?

$$\forall x(\text{Tet}(x) \rightarrow \text{Large}(x))$$
$$\neg \text{Large}(b)$$
$$\neg \text{Tet}(b)$$

Replacement with nonsense predicates:

$$\forall x(\text{Borogove}(x) \rightarrow \text{Mimsy}(x))$$
$$\neg \text{Mimsy}(b)$$
$$\neg \text{Borogove}(b)$$

Is this a valid FO argument?

Replacement with a
meaningless predicate:

$$\neg \exists x \text{ Larger}(x, a)$$

$$\neg \exists x \text{ Larger}(b, x)$$

$$\text{Larger}(c, d)$$

$$\text{Larger}(a, b)$$

$$\neg \exists x R(x, a)$$

$$\neg \exists x R(b, x)$$

$$R(c, d)$$

$$R(a, b)$$

The method of counterexamples

In order to show that the argument

P_1	
...	
P_n	
	<div style="border-top: 1px solid black; padding-top: 5px;">Q</div>

is

not valid, it suffices to give a **counterexample**, i.e. a world that makes the premises P_1, \dots, P_n true, but the conclusion Q false.

(For now, “world” is understood informally. Later on, we will formalize “world” as “first-order structure”.)

A counterexample




Figure 10.1: A first-order counterexample.

Exercises

- chapter 9
- chapter 10: 10.1 to 10.29