Logik für Informatiker Logic for computer scientists

First-order structures

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Till Mossakowski Logic

A first-order structure  ${\mathfrak M}$  consists of:

- a nonempty set  $D^{\mathfrak{M}}$ , the *domain of discourse*;
- for each *n*-ary predicate *P* of the language, a set 𝔐(*P*) of *n*-tuples ⟨x<sub>1</sub>,...,x<sub>n</sub>⟩ of elements of *D*<sup>𝔐</sup>, called the *extension* of *P*. The extension of the identity symbol = must be {⟨x, x⟩ | x ∈ D<sup>𝔐</sup>};
- for any name (individual constant) c of the language, an element  $\mathfrak{M}(c)$  of  $D^{\mathfrak{M}}$ .

A variable assignment in  $\mathfrak{M}$  is a (possibly partial) function g defined on a set of variables and taking values in  $D^{\mathfrak{M}}$ . Given a well-formed formula P, we say that the variable assignment g is appropriate for P if all the free variables of P are in the domain of g, that is, if g assigns objects to each free variable of P.

## $[t]_g^{\mathfrak{M}}$ is

- $\mathfrak{M}(t)$  if t is an individual constant, and
- g(t) if t is a variable.

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Additionally,

- never  $\mathfrak{M} \models \bot[g]$ ;
- always  $\mathfrak{M} \models \top [g]$ .

A structure  $\mathfrak{M}$  satisfies a sentence P,

 $\mathfrak{M}\models P,$ 

if  $\mathfrak{M} \models P[g_{\emptyset}]$  for the empty assignment  $g_{\emptyset}$ .

$$D^{\mathfrak{M}} = \{a, b, c\}$$

$$\mathfrak{M}(\mathit{likes}) = \{ \langle a, a \rangle, \langle a, b \rangle, \langle c, a \rangle \}$$

$$\mathfrak{M} \models \exists x \exists y (Likes(x, y) \land \neg Likes(y, y))$$
$$\mathfrak{M} \models \neg \forall x \exists y (Likes(x, y) \land \neg Likes(y, y))$$

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Proposition Let  $\mathfrak{M}_1$  and  $\mathfrak{M}_2$  be structures which have the same domain and assign the same interpretations to the predicates and constant symbols in P. Let  $g_1$  and  $g_2$  be variable assignments that assign the same objects to the free variables in P. Then

 $\mathfrak{M}_1 \models P[g_1]$  iff  $\mathfrak{M}_2 \models P[g_2]$ 

A sentence P is a *first-order consequence* of a set T of sentences if and only if every structure that satisfies all the sentences in T also satisfies P.

A sentence P is a *first-order validity* if and only if every structure satisfies P.

A set  $\mathcal{T}$  of sentences is called *first-order satisfiable*, if there is a structure satisfies each sentence in  $\mathcal{T}$ .

Theorem If  $\mathcal{T} \vdash S$ , then S is a first-order consequence of  $\mathcal{T}$ .

*Proof:* By induction over the derivation, we show that any sentence occurring in a proof is a first-order consequence of the assumption in force in that step.

An assumption is *in force* in a step if it is an assumption of the current subproof or an assumption of a higher-level proof.

## The basic shape axioms

- $\neg \exists x (Cube(x) \land Tet(x))$
- **③**  $\neg \exists x (Dodec(x) \land Cube(x))$
- $\forall x (Tet(x) \lor Dodec(x) \lor Cube(x))$

## SameShape introduction and elimination axioms

Two structures are *isomorphic* if there is a bijection between their domains, which is compatible with extensions of predicate and interpretation of constants.

Assume the language *Cube*, *Tet*, *Dodec*, *SameShape* 

*Lemma* For any structure satisfying the shape axioms, there is an isomorphic Tarski's world structure.

Theorem Let S be a sentence.

If S is a Tarski's world logical consequence of  $\mathcal{T}$ , then

S is a first-order consequence of  $\mathcal{T}$  plus the shape axioms.

## chapter 18, 18.1-18.19

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