Logik für Informatiker Proofs in propositional logic

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Properties of predicates in Tarski's world

```
-\frac{\mathsf{Larger}(\mathsf{a},\mathsf{b})}{\mathsf{Larger}(\mathsf{b},\mathsf{c})} \\ -\frac{\mathsf{Larger}(\mathsf{b},\mathsf{c})}{\mathsf{Larger}(\mathsf{a},\mathsf{c})} \\ -\frac{\mathsf{RightOf}(\mathsf{b},\mathsf{c})}{\mathsf{LeftOf}(\mathsf{c},\mathsf{b})}
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Such arguments can be proved in Fitch using the special rule **Ana Con**.

This rule is only valid for reasoning about Tarski's world!

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Showing invalidity using counterexamples

Al Gore is a politician Hardly any politicians are honest

Al Gore is dishonest

Imagine a situation where there are 10,000 politicians, and that Al Gore is the only honest one of the lot. In such circumstances both premises would be true but the conclusion would be false.

This demonstrates that the argument is *invalid*.

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Are the following arguments valid?

```
Small(a)
Larger(b, a)
Large(b)
Small(a)
Larger(a, b)
Large(b)
```

Negation — Truth table

Р	−P
TRUE	FALSE
FALSE	TRUE

1.1

The Henkin-Hintikka game



The Henkin-Hintikka game

Is a sentence true in a given world?

- Players: you and the computer (Tarski's world)
- You claim that a sentence is true (or false), Tarski's world will claim the opposite
- In each round, the sentence is reduced to a simpler one
- When an atomic sentence is reached, its truth can be directly inspected in the given world

You have a *winning strategy* exactly in those cases where your claim is *correct*.

Negation — Game rule

Form	Your commitment	Player to move	Goal
$\neg P$	either	_	Replace $\neg P$ by P and
			switch commitment

Conjunction — Truth table

Р	Q	$P \wedge Q$
TRUE	TRUE	TRUE
TRUE	FALSE	FALSE
FALSE	TRUE	FALSE
FALSE	FALSE	FALSE

Conjunction — Game rule

Form	Your commitment	Player to move	Goal
	TRUE	Tarski's World	Choose one of P ,
$P \wedge Q$			Q that is false.
	FALSE	you	

Disjunction — Truth table

P	Q	$P \lor Q$
TRUE	TRUE	TRUE
TRUE	FALSE	TRUE
FALSE	TRUE	TRUE
FALSE	FALSE	FALSE

Disjunction — Game rule

Form	Your commitment	Player to move	Goal
	TRUE	you	Choose one of P ,
$P \lor Q$			Q that is true.
	FALSE	Tarski's World	

Formalisation

- Sometimes, natural language double negation means logical single negation
- The English expression and sometimes suggests a temporal ordering; the FOL expression ∧ never does.
- The English expressions but, however, yet, nonetheless, and moreover are all stylistic variants of and.
- Natural language disjunction can mean *invlusive-or* (\vee) or *exclusive-or*. A xor $B \Leftrightarrow (A \vee B) \wedge (\neg A \vee \neg B)$

Logical necessity

- logically necessary, or logically valid, if it is true in all circumstances (worlds),
- logically possible, or satisfiable, if it is true in some circumstances (worlds),
- logically impossible, or unsatisfiable, if it is true in no circumstances (worlds).

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Logically impossible $P \land \neg P$ $a \neq a$

Logically and physically possible



Logically necessary $P \lor \neg P$ a = a



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Logically necessary

$$P \lor \neg P$$
 $a = a$

Logic, Boolean logic and Tarski's world


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- TW-necessary, if it is true in all worlds of Tarski's world,
- a tautology, if it is true in all valuations of the atomic sentences with {TRUE, FALSE}.

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The truth table method

- A sentence is a tautology if and only if it evaluates to TRUE in all rows of its complete truth table.
- Truth tables can be constructed with the program Boole.

- Two sentences P and Q are tautologically equivalent, if they
 evaluate to the same truth value in all valuations (rows of the
 truth table).
- Q is a tautological consequence of P_1, \ldots, P_n if and only if every row that assigns TRUE to each of $P1, \ldots P_n$ also assigns TRUE to Q.
- If Q is a tautological consequence of $P_1, \ldots P_n$, then Q is also a *logical consequence* of P_1, \ldots, P_n .
- Some logical consequences are not tautological ones.

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