



University of Bremen

Avoiding Mode Confusion in Service Robots

The Bremen Autonomous Wheelchair “Rolland” as an Example from Rehabilitation Robotics

Axel Lankenau

Bremen Institute of Safe Systems
Center for Computing Technologies
University of Bremen
Germany





www.tzi.de/rolland

Outline of the Talk

Intro




Mode Confusion

Rolland







Results







Rehab-Robots: Safety-Critical Systems



- ▶ **Persons more and more depend on the machine**
 - ▶ User, e.g. the driver of a wheelchair robot
 - ▶ People in the surroundings, e.g. passengers in an airport building
- ▶ **Designing a rehabilitation robot is designing a safety-critical system**
 - ▶ Malfunctions can cause severe harm to people
 - ▶ Formal approach to design, verify and test

What makes Shared-Control Special?



- ▶ **Human operator and technical system jointly in control**
 - ▶ Divergent internal representation of current system state possible
 - ▶ Result: *mode confusion*




Mode Confusion

- ▶ **What and where is mode confusion**
 - ▶ Divergent assumption about current system state
 - ▶ Shared-control with varying prioritization between operator and automation
- ▶ **Primary sources for mode confusion (Butler et al., 1999)**
 - ▶ Opacity
 - ▶ Complexity
 - ▶ Incorrect mental model
- ▶ **Error categories (Leveson et al., 1997)**
 - ▶ Interface interpretation error, operator authority limit
 - ▶ Lack of appropriate feedback, indirect mode change
- ▶ **Close relation to feature interaction (Cameron et al., 1994)**
 - ▶ Checking for inconsistencies in telecommunication contexts




Mode Confusion Potential – Example

▶ Divergent mental and automation model



Model-Checking for Mode Confusion

- ▶ Butler et al. (NASA Langley) and Rushby et al. (SRI)
- ▶ **Automation** can be modeled as a state machine




- ▶ **Mental model** of the automation as a state machine
- ▶ Standard model checking tools can search for mode confusions

Mode Confusion in Rehab-Robots

▶ Human-machine interface




▶ Shared-Control




- ▶ **Adaptability to specific needs of each particular user**
- ▶ **Mode rich**
 - ▶ Making use of a variety of sensors/actuators and interfaces
 - ▶ Probably many levels of support
- ▶ **Example: Bremen Autonomous Wheelchair “Rolland”**


Working Group "Cognitive Robotics"




Spatial Cognition




Navigation



Safe Robotics



Driving Assistant



Route Assistant



Navigation Assistant




Bremen Wheelchair “Rolland”

- ▶ **The wheelchair robot**
 - ▶ Model “Genius 1.522” by Meyra
 - ▶ Maximum speed 84 cm/s
 - ▶ Communication via two serial links
- ▶ **Sensors**
 - ▶ Internal (speed/steering angle)
 - ▶ 27 sonar sensors (Nomadic)
 - ▶ SICK laser range finder
- ▶ **Computing power**
 - ▶ Industrial-PC (Pentium III 600)
 - ▶ QNX (real-time OS)



Cooperative Obstacle Avoidance



© hitec, 3sat (2000)

Analysis I - Modeling

► Specification of both models in CSP (Hoare, 1985)


```
HAND_U = hand_u -> read_tm?v_t.r_t ->
  if (v_t == 0) then
    handStop -> STOP_U
  else
    read_u_free?free ->
    if (free == true) then
      HAND_U
    else
      handAuto -> AUTO_U
```

U
S
E
R

```
HAND_A = hand_a -> read_tm?v_t.r_t ->
  if (v_t == 0) then
    handStop -> STOP_A
  else
    read_a_free?free ->
    if (free == true) then
      frameTick -> HAND_A
    else
      writeOriginalRadius!r_t ->
      readCurrentOrientation?co ->
      writeTargetOrientation!co ->
      handAuto ->
      AUTO_A
```

A
U
T
O
M
A
T
I
O
N

Analysis II - Divergence Check



The screenshot displays the FDR 2.75 interface. The main window shows a list of model checking results:

- ✗ CHECK_AUTOMATION4[[EXT]]CHECK_TEST [F= CHECK_USER4[[EXT]]CHECK_TEST
- ✓ CHECK_AUTOMATION5 [T= CHECK_USER4
- ✓ CHECK_AUTOMATION5 [F= CHECK_USER4
- ✓ CHECK_AUTOMATION5[[EXT]]CHECK_TEST [F=

Below the list, a scrollable area shows process names: AUTOMATION, AUTO_A, AUTO_U, BACK2ROTATION, CHAOS(-).

Two FDR2 debugger windows are open, showing state transition diagrams and performance metrics:

- Top Debugger (FDR Debug 1):** Shows a state transition diagram for `CHECK_AUTOMATION4` and `CHECK_TEST`. The **Performs** list includes: `hand_a`, `read_tm.1.-1`, `read_a_free.false`, `handAuto`, `auto_a`, `read_tm.-1.1`, and `read_a_free.true`. The **Accepts** list includes: `{read_tm_br}`.
- Bottom Debugger (FDR2 debugger):** Shows a state transition diagram for `CHECK_USER4` and `CHECK_TEST`. The **Performs** list includes: `hand_u`, `read_tm.1.-1`, `read_u_free.false`, `handAuto`, `auto_u`, `read_tm.-1.1`, `read_u_free.true`, `autoHand`, `hand_u`, and `read_tm.1.-1`.

Model Checking
with FDR2



Conclusion & Future Work

- ▶ **Shared-Control and Mode Confusion in Rehabilitation Robots**
 - ▶ Rehabilitation robots are safety-critical systems
 - ▶ Rehabilitation robots interact with people and are often “mode rich”
 - ▶ Shared-control aspects and mode confusion potential
- ▶ **Cooperative Obstacle Avoidance of the Bremen Wheelchair**
 - ▶ Current implementation
 - ▶ Formal analysis of mode confusion potential by model checking
- ▶ **Future Work**
 - ▶ Multi-modal human-machine interface
 - ▶ Formal framework to mechanize detection of mode confusion potential
 - ▶ *Modeling of the human operator as “second environment”*
 - ▶ *Derivation of critical situations from fault-tree based system specification*
 - ▶ Integration of the feature interaction and mode confusion experiences



For details, references, demos,
(these) slides, jobs, etc.,

please visit us at

www.tzi.de/rolland

