


Systeme hoher Sicherheit und Qualität
Universität Bremen, WS 2017/2018



Lecture 3: The Software Development Process

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Where are we?

- ▶ 01: Concepts of Quality
- ▶ 02: Legal Requirements: Norms and Standards
- ▶ 03: The Software Development Process
- ▶ 04: Hazard Analysis
- ▶ 05: High-Level Design with SysML
- ▶ 06: Formal Modelling with OCL
- ▶ 07: Testing
- ▶ 08: Static Program Analysis
- ▶ 09-10: Software Verification
- ▶ 11-12: Model Checking
- ▶ 13: Conclusions

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Software Development Models


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Software Development Process

- ▶ A software development process is the **structure** imposed on the development of a software product.
- ▶ We classify processes according to **models** which specify
 - ▶ the artefacts of the development, such as
 - ▶ the software product itself, specifications, test documents, reports, reviews, proofs, plans etc;
 - ▶ the different stages of the development;
 - ▶ and the artefacts associated to each stage.
- ▶ Different models have a different focus:
 - ▶ Correctness, development time, flexibility.
- ▶ What does quality mean in this context?
 - ▶ What is the **output**? Just the software product, or more? (specifications, test runs, documents, proofs...)

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Artefacts in the Development Process



Planning:

- Document plan
- V&V plan
- QM plan
- Test plan
- Project manual

Specifications:

- Requirements
- System specification
- Module specification
- User documents

Implementation:

- Source code
- Models
- Documentation

Possible formats:

- Documents:
 - Word documents
 - Excel sheets
 - Wiki text
 - Database (Doors)
- Models:
 - UML/SysML diagrams
 - Formal languages: Z, HOL, etc.
 - Matlab/Simulink or similar diagrams
- Source code


Verification & validation:

- Code review protocols
- Test cases, procedures, and test results
- Proofs

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Waterfall Model (Royce 1970)

▶ Classical top-down sequential workflow with strictly separated phases.



▶ Unpractical as actual workflow (no feedback between phases), but even the original paper did **not** really suggest this.

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Spiral Model (Böhm, 1986)

▶ Incremental development guided by **risk factors**

▶ Four phases:


- ▶ Determine objectives
- ▶ Analyse risks
- ▶ Development and test
- ▶ Review, plan next iteration

▶ See e.g.

- ▶ Rational Unified Process (RUP)

▶ Drawbacks:

- ▶ Risk identification is the key, and can be quite difficult




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Model-Driven Development (MDD, MDE)

▶ Describe problems on abstract level using a *modeling language* (often a *domain-specific language*), and derive implementation by model transformation or run-time interpretation.

▶ Often used with UML (or its DSLs, eg. SysML)



▶ Variety of tools:

- ▶ Rational tool chain, Enterprise Architect, Rhapsody, Papyrus, Artisan Studio, MetaEdit+, Matlab/Simulink/Stateflow*
- ▶ EMF (Eclipse Modelling Framework)

▶ Strictly sequential development

▶ Drawbacks: high initial investment, limited flexibility

* Proprietary DSL – not related to UML

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
Agile Methods

- ▶ Prototype-driven development
 - ▶ E.g. Rapid Application Development
 - ▶ Development as a sequence of prototypes
 - ▶ Ever-changing safety and security requirements
- ▶ Agile programming
 - ▶ E.g. Scrum, extreme programming
 - ▶ Development guided by functional requirements
 - ▶ Process structured by rules of conduct for developers
 - ▶ Rules capture best practice
 - ▶ Less support for non-functional requirements
- ▶ Test-driven development
 - ▶ Tests as *executable specifications*: write tests first
 - ▶ Often used together with the other two




V-Model

- ▶ Evolution of the waterfall model:
 - ▶ Each phase is supported by a corresponding testing phase (verification & validation)
 - ▶ Feedback between next and previous phase
- ▶ Standard model for public projects in Germany
 - ▶ ... but also a general term for models of this „shape“



Software Development Models



from S. Paulus: Sichere Software



Development Models for Safety-Critical Systems

Development Models for Critical Systems

- ▶ Ensuring safety/security needs structure.
 - ▶ ...but *too much* structure makes developments bureaucratic, which is *in itself* a safety risk.
 - ▶ Cautionary tale: Ariane-5
- ▶ Standards put emphasis on **process**.
 - ▶ Everything needs to be planned and documented.
 - ▶ Key issues: **auditability, accountability, traceability**.
- ▶ Best suited development models are variations of the V-model or spiral model.
- ▶ A new trend?
 - ▶ V-Model for initial developments of a new product
 - ▶ Agile models (e.g. Scrum) for maintenance and product extensions



Auditability and Accountability

- ▶ Version control and configuration management is **mandatory** in safety-critical development (auditability).
- ▶ Keeping track of all artifacts contributing to a particular instance (**build**) of the system (**configuration**), and their **versions**.
- ▶ **Repository** keeps all artifacts in all versions.
 - ▶ Centralised: one repository vs. distributed (every developer keeps own repository)
 - ▶ General model: check out – modify – commit
 - ▶ Concurrency: enforced **lock**, or **merge** after commit.
- ▶ Well-known systems:
 - ▶ Commercial: ClearCase, Perforce, Bitkeeper...
 - ▶ Open Source: Subversion (centr.); Git, Mercurial (distr.)




Traceability

- ▶ The idea of being able to follow requirements (in particular, safety requirements) from requirement spec to the code (and possibly back).
- ▶ On the simplest level, an Excel sheet with (manual) links to the program.
- ▶ More sophisticated tools include DOORS.
 - ▶ Decompose requirements, hierarchical requirements
 - ▶ Two-way traceability: from code, test cases, test procedures, and test results back to requirements
 - ▶ E.g. DO-178B requires all code derives from requirements




Development Model in IEC 61508

- ▶ IEC 61508 in principle allows any development model, but:
 - ▶ It requires safety-directed activities in each phase of the life cycle (safety life cycle).
 - ▶ Development is one part of the life cycle.
- ▶ The only development model mentioned is a V-model:



The Safety Life Cycle (IEC 61508)



E/E/PES: Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-related Systems

Development Model in DO-178B


► DO-178B defines different *processes* in the SW life cycle:

- Planning process
- Development process, structured in turn into
 - Requirements process
 - Design process
 - Coding process
 - Integration process
- Verification process
- Quality assurance process
- Configuration management process
- Certification liaison process


► There is no conspicuous diagram, but the Development Process has sub-processes suggesting the phases found in the V-model as well.

- Implicit recommendation of the V-model.

Development Model for Hardware



Development Model for Hardware




Basic Notions of Formal Software Development

Formal Software Development

- In a formal development, properties are stated in a rigorous way with a **precise mathematical semantics**.
- Formal specification requirements can be **proven**.
- **Advantages:**
 - Errors can be found early in the development process.
 - High degree of confidence into the system.
 - Recommend use of formal methods for high SILs/EALs.
- **Drawbacks:**
 - Requires a lot of effort and is thus expensive.
 - Requires qualified personnel (that would be you).
- There are tools which can help us by
 - finding (simple) proofs for us (model checkers), or
 - checking our (more complicated) proofs (theorem provers).

Formal Semantics

► **States** and transitions between them:



► **Operational semantics** describes relation between states and transitions:


$$\frac{s \vdash e \rightarrow n}{s \vdash x := e \rightarrow s[x/n]} \quad \text{hence:} \quad \frac{s_0 \vdash y + 4 \rightarrow 7}{s_0 \vdash x := y + 4 \rightarrow s_1}$$

► **Formal proofs**; e.g. proving

$$x := y + 4; z := y - 2 \text{ yields the same final state as } z := y - 2; x := y + 4$$

Semantics of Programs and Requirements

► Set of all possible system runs



► **Requirements** related to safety and security:

- Requirements on single states ?
- Requirements on system runs ?
- Requirements on sets of system runs ?



Some Notions

- ▶ Let b, t be two traces then
 $b \leq t$ iff $\exists t'. t = b \cdot t'$ i.e. b is a *finite prefix* of t
- ▶ A **property** is a set of infinite execution traces (like a program)
 - ▶ Trace t satisfies property P , written $t \models P$, iff $t \in P$
- ▶ A **hyperproperty** is a set of sets of infinite execution traces (like a set of programs)
 - ▶ A system (set of traces) S satisfies H iff $S \in H$
 - ▶ An observation Obs is a finite set of finite traces
 - ▶ $Obs \leq S$ (Obs is a prefix of S) iff Obs is an observation and $\forall m \in Obs. \exists t \in S. m \leq t$



Requirements on States: Safety Properties

- ▶ Safety property S : „Nothing bad happens“
 - ▶ i.e. the system will never enter a *bad* state
 - ▶ E.g. „Lights of crossing streets do not go green at the same time“
- ▶ A bad state:
 - ▶ can be immediately recognized;
 - ▶ cannot be sanitized by following states.
- ▶ S is a safety property iff
 - ▶ $\forall t. t \notin S \rightarrow (\exists t_1, t_2. t = t_1 \cdot t_2 \rightarrow \forall t_3. t_1 \cdot t_3 \notin S)$




Satisfying Safety Properties

- ▶ Safety properties are typically proven by induction
 - ▶ Base case: initial states are good (= not bad)
 - ▶ Step case: each transition transforms a good state again in a good state
- ▶ Safety properties can be enforced by run-time monitors
 - ▶ Monitor checks following state in advance and allows execution only if it is a good state



Requirements on Runs: Liveness Properties

- ▶ Liveness property L :
 - ▶ „Good things will happen eventually“
 - ▶ E.g. „my traffic light will go green eventually *“
- ▶ A good thing is always possible and possibly infinite.
- ▶ L is a liveness property iff
 - ▶ $\forall t. \text{finite}(t) \rightarrow \exists t_1. t \cdot t_1 \in L$
 - ▶ i.e. all finite traces t can be extended to a trace in L .



* Achtung: „eventually“ bedeutet „irgendwann“ oder „schlussendlich“ aber *nicht* „eventuell“!




Satisfying Liveness Properties

- ▶ Liveness properties cannot (!) be enforced by run-time monitors.
- ▶ Liveness properties are typically proven by the help of well-founded orderings
 - ▶ Measure function m on states s
 - ▶ Each transition decreases m
 - ▶ $t \in L$ if we reach a state with minimal m
- ▶ E.g. measure denotes the number of transitions for the light to go green



Requirements on Sets of Runs: Safety Hyperproperties

- ▶ Safety hyperproperty: „System never behaves bad“
 - ▶ No bad thing happens in a finite set of finite traces (the prefixes of) different system runs do not exclude each other
 - ▶ E.g. „the traffic light cycle is always the same“
- ▶ A bad system can be recognized by a bad observation (set of finite runs)
 - ▶ A bad observation cannot be sanitized regards less how we continue it or add additional system runs
 - ▶ E.g. two system runs having different traffic light cycles
- ▶ S is a safety hyperproperty iff
 - ▶ $\forall T \notin S. (\exists Obs \leq T. \forall T'. Obs \leq T' \Rightarrow T' \notin S)$




Requirements on Sets of Runs: Liveness Hyperproperties

- ▶ Liveness hyperproperty S :
 - ▶ „The system will eventually develop to a good system“
 - ▶ Considering any finite part of a system behavior, the system eventually develops into a „good“ system (by continuing appropriately the system runs or adding new system runs)
 - ▶ E.g. „Green light for pedestrians can always be omitted“
- ▶ L is liveness hyperproperty iff $\forall T. (\exists G. T \leq G \wedge G \in L)$
 - ▶ T is a finite set of finite traces (observation)
 - ▶ Each observation can be explained by a system G satisfying L
- ▶ Example:
 - ▶ Average response time
 - ▶ Closure operations in information flow control



Landscape of (Hyper)Properties

- ▶ Each (hyper-) property can be represented as a combination of safety and liveness (hyper-) properties.



Vertical Structuring - Refinement

- ▶ Idea: start at an abstract description and add details step by step

From abstract specification to an implementation

- ▶ What shall be refined?
 - ▶ Algorithm: algebraic refinement
 - ▶ Data: data refinement
 - ▶ Process: process refinement
 - ▶ Events: action refinement



Algebraic Refinement

Stack empty: stack; push(int, stack):stack
pop(stack):stack
pop(empty) = empty; pop(push(x, y)) = y

Refinement

Satisfies

To prove: $li_pop(li_empty) = li_empty$
 $Li_pop(li_push(x, y)) = y$

Implementing stacks by lists li_empty = nil
li_push(x, y) = cons(x, y)
li_pop(x) = tail(x)

List nil: list cons(int, list):list
first(list):int tail(list):int
...
first(nil) = -1 first(cons(x, y)) = x
tail(nil) = nil tail(cons(x, y)) = y

Refinement preserves properties of stack by transitivity of the logic !



Even More Refinements

- ▶ Data refinement
 - ▶ Abstract datatype is „implemented“ in terms of the more concrete datatype
 - ▶ Simple example: define stack with lists
- ▶ Process refinement
 - ▶ Process is refined by excluding certain runs
 - ▶ Refinement as a reduction of underspecification by eliminating possible behaviours
- ▶ Action refinement
 - ▶ Action is refined by a sequence of actions
 - ▶ E.g. a stub for a procedure is refined to an executable procedure



Conclusion & Summary

- ▶ Software development models: structure vs. flexibility
- ▶ Safety standards such as IEC 61508, DO-178B suggest development according to V-model.
 - ▶ Specification and implementation linked by verification and validation.
 - ▶ Variety of artefacts produced at each stage, which have to be subjected to external review.
- ▶ Safety / Security Requirements
 - ▶ Properties: sets of traces
 - ▶ Hyperproperties: sets of properties
- ▶ Structuring of the development:
 - ▶ Horizontal – e.g. composition
 - ▶ Vertical – refinement (e.g. algebraic, data, process...)

