Systeme hoher Sicherheit und Qualität Universität Bremen, WS 2017/2018



Lecture 10:

## **Verification Condition Generation**

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#### Where are we?

- 01: Concepts of Quality
- ▶ 02: Legal Requirements: Norms and Standards
- 03: The Software Development Process
- 04: Hazard Analysis
- 05: High-Level Design with SysML
- 06: Formal Modelling with OCL
- 07: Testing
- ▶ 08: Static Program Analysis
- ▶ 09: Software Verification with Floyd-Hoare Logic
- 10: Correctness and Verification Condition Generation
- ▶ 11-12: Model Checking
- 13: Conclusions

## Introduction

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- ► In the last lecture, we introduced Hoare triples. They allow us to state and prove correctness assertions about programs, written as {P} p {Q}
- ▶ We introduced two notions, namely:
  - Syntactic derivability, ⊢ {P} p {Q} (the actual Floyd-Hoare calculus)
  - Semantic satisfaction,  $\models \{P\} p \{Q\}$
- Question: how are the two related?
- The answer to that question also offers help with a practical problem: proofs with the Floyd-Hoare calculus are exceedingly long and tedious. Can we automate them, and how?

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## **Correctness of the Floyd-Hoare calculus**

**Theorem** (Correctness of the Floyd-Hoare calculus) If  $\vdash$  {*P*} *p* {*Q*}, then  $\models$  {*P*} *p* {*Q*}.

- ▶ Proof: by induction on the derivation of  $\vdash$  {*P*} *p* {*Q*}.
- More precisely, for each rule we show that:
  - ▶ If the conclusion is  $\vdash$  {*P*} *p* {*Q*}, we can show  $\models$  {*P*} *p* {*Q*}

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- For the premisses, this can be assumed.
- Example: for the assignment rule, we show that


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Frohes Neues Jahr!

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#### VCG in the Development Cycle

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#### **Correctness and Completeness**

- In general, given a syntactic calculus with a semantic meaning, correctness means the syntactic calculus implies the semantic meaning, and completeness means all semantic statements can be derived syntactically.
  - Cf. also Static Program Analysis
- Correctness should be a basic property of verification calculi.
- Completeness is elusive due to Gödel's first incompleteness theorem:
  - Any logics which is strong enough to encode the natural numbers and primitive recursion\* is incomplete.\*\*
- \* Or any other notion of computation.
- \*\* Or inconsistent, which is even worse.

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#### **Completeness of the Floyd-Hoare calculus**

Predicate calculus is incomplete, so we cannot hope F/H is complete. But we get the following:

**Theorem** (Relative completeness) If  $\models$  {*P*} *p* {*Q*}, then  $\vdash$  {*P*} *p* {*Q*} *except* for the proofs occuring in the weakenings.

► To show this, we construct the **weakest precondition**.

#### Weakest precondition

Given a program c and an assertion P, the weakest precondition wp(c, P) is an assertion W such that *1*. *W* is a valid precondition  $\models \{W\} c \{P\}$ 

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- 2. And it is the weakest such: for any other Q such
  - that  $\models \{Q\} c \{P\}, W \rightarrow Q$

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### **Constructing the weakest precondition**

• Consider a simple program and its verification:


 $\{x = X \land y = Y\}$  $\{y = Y \land x = X\}$ z := y;  $\{z = Y \land x = X\}$ y := x;  $\{z = Y \land y = X\}$ x := z:  $\{x = Y \land y = X\}$ 

#### Note how proof is constructed backwards systematically.

- ▶ The idea is to construct the weakest precondition inductively.
- ▶ This also gives us a methodology to automate proofs in the calculus.

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## **Calculation Verification Conditions**

- Intuitively, we calculate the verification conditions by stepping through the program backwards, starting with the postcondition Q.
- ▶ For each of the four simple cases (assignment, sequencing, case distinction and *skip*), we calculate new current postcondition 0
- ▶ At each iteration, we calculate the precondition *R* of the loop body working backwards from the invariant I, and get two verification conditions:
  - The invariant I and negated loop condition implies Q.

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- The invariant I and loop condition implies R.
- Asserting *R* generates the verification condition  $R \Rightarrow Q$ .
- Let's try this.

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### **Formal Definition**

Calculating the precondition:  $pre(\mathbf{skip}, Q) = Q$  $pre(X \coloneqq e, Q) = Q[e / X]$  $pre(c_0; c_1, Q = pre(c_0, pre(c_1, Q))$  $pre(\mathbf{if}(b) c_0 \mathbf{else}(c_1, Q)) = (b \wedge pre(c_0, Q)) \vee (\neg b \wedge pre(c_1, Q))$ pre(assert R, Q) = Rpre (while (b)inv I c, Q) = ICalculating the verification conditions:  $vc(skip, Q) = \emptyset$  $vc(X \coloneqq e, Q) = \emptyset$  $vc(c_0; c_1, Q) = vc(c_0, pre(c_1, Q)) \cup vc(c_1, Q)$  $vc(\mathbf{if}(b) c_0 \mathbf{else}(c_1, Q)) = vc(c_0, Q) \cup vc(c_1, Q)$  $vc(\textbf{while }(b) \textbf{ inv } I c, Q) = vc(c, I) \cup \{I \land b \Rightarrow pre(c, I), I \land \neg b \Rightarrow Q\}$  $vc(assert R, Q) = \{R \Rightarrow Q\}$ ► The main definition:  $vcg({P} c {Q}) = {P \Rightarrow pre(c, Q)} \cup vc(c, Q)$ Systeme hoher Sicherheit und Qualität, WS 17/18 DKW - 15 -

### **Constructing the weakest precondition**

There are four straightforward cases: (1)  $wp(\mathbf{skip}, P) = P$ (2)  $wp(X \coloneqq e, P) = P[e / X]$ (3)  $wp(c_0; c_1, P) = wp(c_0, wp(c_1, P))$ (4)  $wp(\mathbf{if} \ b \ \{c_0\} \mathbf{else} \ \{c_1\}, P) = (b \land wp(c_0, p)) \lor (\neg b \land wp(c_1, P))$ ▶ The complicated one is iteration (unsurprisingly, since it is the source of the computational power and Turing-completeness of the language). It can be given recursively:

(5)  $wp(while b \{c\}, P) = (\neg b \land P) \lor wp(c, wp(while b \{c\}, P))$ 

- A closed formula can be given, but it can be infinite and is not practical. It shows the relative completeness, but does not give us an effective way to automate proofs.
- Hence, wp(c, P) is not effective for proof automation, but it shows the right way: we just need something for iterations. - 10 -

#### **Preconditions and Verification Conditions**

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
- ▶ We are given an annotated statement *c*, a precondition P and a postcondition Q.
  - We want to know: when does  $\models$  {*P*} *c* {*Q*} hold?
- ▶ For this, we calculate a **precondition** *pre*(*c*,*Q*) and a **set** of verification conditions vc(c, Q).
  - The idea is that if all the verification conditions hold, then the precondition holds:

$$\bigwedge_{R \in \nu c(c,Q)} R \Rightarrow \vDash \{ pre(c,Q) \} c \{ Q \}$$

▶ For the precondition *P*, we get the additional weaking  $P \Rightarrow pre(c, Q).$ 

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#### **Correctness of VC**

- ▶ The correctness calculus is correct: if we can prove all the verifcation conditons, the program is correct w.r.t to given pre- and postconditions.
- ► Formally:

Theorem (Correctness of the VCG calculus) Given assertions *P* and *Q* (with *P* the precondition and *Q* the postcondition), and an annotated program, then

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$$\bigwedge_{R \in vcq(c, Q)} R \Rightarrow \models \{P\} c \{Q\}$$

▶ Proof: by induction on *c*.

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#### **Using VCG in Real Life**

- We have just a toy language, but VCG can be used in real life. What features are missing?
- Modularity: the language must have modularity concepts, e.g. functions (as in C), or classes (as in Java), and we must be able to verify them separately.
- Framing: in our simple calculus, we need to specify which variables stay the same (e.g. when entering a loop). This becomes tedious when there are a lot of variables involved; it is more practical to specify which variables may change.
- References: languages such as C and Java use references, which allow aliasing. This has to be modelled semantically; specifically, the assignment rule has to be adapted.
- Machine arithmetic: programs work with machine words and floating point representations, not integers and real numbers. This can be the cause of insidious errors.

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## VCC Example: Binary Search

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### **VCC Example: Binary Search**

#### Source code as annotated for VCC:

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#### Summary

Starting from the relative completeness of the Floyd-Hoare calculus, we devised a verification condition generation (vcg) calculus which makes program verification viable.

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- Verification condition generation reduces the question whether the given pre/postconditions hold for a program to the validity of a set of logical properties.
  - We do need to annotate the while loops with invariants.
  - Most of these logical properties can be discharged with automated theorem provers.
- To scale to real-world programs, we need to deal with framing, modularity (each function/method needs to be verified independently), and machine arithmetic (integer word arithmetic and floating-points).

### VCG Tools

- Often use an intermediate language for VCG and front-ends for concrete programming languages.
- The Why3 toolset (<u>http://why3.lri.fr</u>)
  - A verification condition generator
  - Front-ends for different languages: C (Frama-C), Java (defunct?)
- Boogie (Microsoft Research)
  - Frontends for programming languages such C, C#, Java.

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 VCC - a verifying C compiler built on top of Boogie
Interactive demo: https://www.rise4fun.com/Vcc/

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### VCC: Correctness Conditions?

- ▶ We need to annotate the program.
- Precondition:

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- a is an array of length a len;
- The array a is sorted.
- ▶ Postcondition:
  - ▶ Let r be the result, then:
  - If r is UINT MAX, all elements of a are unequal to key;
  - if r is not UINT\_MAX, then a[r] == key.
- Loop invariants:
  - hi is less-equal to a\_len;
  - everything "left" of 10 is less then key;
  - everything "right" of hi is larger-equal to key.
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