

Systeme hoher Sicherheit und Qualität Universität Bremen, WS 2017/2018

Lecture 11:

Model Checking

Christoph Lüth, Dieter Hutter, Jan Peleska

Universität Bremen

Introduction

- In the last lectures, we were verifying program properties with the Floyd-Hoare calculus (or verification condition generation). Program verification translates the question of program correctness into a proof in program logic (the Floyd-Hoare logic), turning it into a deductive problem.
- Model-checking takes a different approach: instead of directly working with the (source code) of the program, we work with an abstraction of the system (the system model). Because we build an abstraction, this approach is also applicable at higher verification levels. (It is also complimentary to deductive verification.)
- The key questions are: how do these models look like? What properties do we want to express, and how do we express and prove them?

Introduction

systeme hoher Sicherheit und Qualität, WS 17/18

- Model checking operates on (abstract) state machines
 - Does an abstract system satisfy some behavioral property
 - e.g. liveness (deadlock) or safety properties
 - consider traffic lights in Requirement Engineering
 - Example: "green must always follow red"
- Automatic analysis if state machine is finite
 - Push-button technology
 - User does not need to know logic (at least not for the proof)
- Basis is satisfiability of boolean formula in a finite domain (SAT). However, finiteness does not imply efficiency – all interesting problems are at least NP-complete, and SAT is no exception (Cook's theorem).

- 5 -

Systeme hoher Sicherheit und Qualität, WS 17/18

```
D F< W
```

DKW

Finite State Machine (FSM)

Definition: Finite State Machine (FSM)

- A FSM is given by $\mathcal{M} = \langle \Sigma, I, \rightarrow \rangle$ where
 - Σ is a finite set of states,
 - $I \subseteq \Sigma$ is a set of **initial** states, and
 - $\rightarrow \subseteq \Sigma \times \Sigma$ is a transition relation, s.t. \rightarrow is left-total: $\forall s \in \Sigma : \exists s' \in \Sigma : s \rightarrow s'$
- ► Variations of this definition exists, e.g. no initial states.
- Note there is no final state, and no input or output (this is the key difference to automata).
- \blacktriangleright If \rightarrow is a function, the FSM is deterministic, otherwise it is non-deterministic.

-7-

me hoher Sicherheit und Qualität, WS 17/18


Where are we?

- 01: Concepts of Quality02: Legal Requirements: Norms and Standards
- 03: The Software Development Process
- 04: Hazard Analysis
- 05: High-Level Design with SysML
- 06: Formal Modelling with OCL
- 07: Testing
- 08: Static Program Analysis
- 09: Software Verification with Floyd-Hoare Logic
- 10: Correctness and Verification Condition Generation
- 11: Model Checking
 12: Table for Model Checking
- 12: Tools for Model Checking
- 13: Conclusions


me hoher Sicherheit und Qualität, WS 17/18

DKW

DKW



- 2 -



The Model-Checking Problem

The Basic Question:

Given a model $\mathcal M$ and property ϕ , we want to know if $\mathcal M \models \phi$


- What is \mathcal{M} ? A finite-state machine or Kripke structure.
- What is ϕ ? Temporal logic
- ► How to prove it?
 - By enumerating the states and thus construct a model (hence model checking)

- 6 -

The basic problem: state explosion



Example: A Simple Oven



DK W

Questions to ask


We want to answer **questions** about the system **behaviour** like

- If the cooker heats, then is the door closed?
- > When the start button is pushed, will the cooker eventually heat up?
- > When the cooker is correctly started, will the cooker eventually heat up?
- > When an error occurs, will it be still possible to cook?

We are interested in guestions on the development of the system over time, i.e. possible traces of the system given by a succession of states.

Systeme hoher Sicherheit und Qualität, WS 17/18

DKW



Semantics of Kripke Structures (Prop)

- > We now want to define a logic in which we can formalize temporal statements, i.e. statements about the behaviour of the system and its changes over time.
- The basis is open propositional logic (PL): negation, conjunction, disjunction, implication*.
- With that, we define how a PL-formula ϕ holds in a Kripke structure K at state s , written as $K, s \models p$.

- 13


- 15

- Let $K = \langle \Sigma, I, \rightarrow, V \rangle$ be a Kripke structure, $s \in \Sigma$, and ϕ a formula of propositional logic, then
 - ► $K, s \models p$ if $p \in Prop$ and $s \in V(p)$
 - $\blacktriangleright K, s \vDash \neg \phi$ if not $K, s \models \phi$
 - ► $K, s \models \phi_1 \land \phi_2$ if $K, s \models \phi_1$ and $K, s \models \phi_2$
 - $K, s \models \phi_1 \lor \phi_2$ if $K, s \models \phi_1$ or $K, s \models \phi_2$
- * Note implication is derived: $\phi_1 \rightarrow \phi_2 = \neg \phi_1 \lor \phi_2$

Systeme hoher Sicherheit und Qualität, WS 17/18

DKW

)K Ü



▶ No, need to add a transition.



Temporal Logic


Expresses properties of possible succession of states






DKW

Systeme hoher Sicherheit und Qualität, WS 17/18 - 10 **Kripke Structure: Example**







Paths in an FSM/Kripke Structure A path in an FSM (or Kripke structure) is a sequence of states starting in one of the initial states and connected by the transition relation (essentially, a **run** of the system). ► Formally: for an FSM $M = \langle \Sigma, I, \rightarrow \rangle$ or a Kripke structure $K = \langle \Sigma, I, \rightarrow, V \rangle$, a **path** is given by a sequence $s_1 s_2 s_3 \dots \in \Sigma^*$ such that $s_1 \in I$ and $s_i \to s_{i+1}$. For a path $p = s_1 s_2 s_3 \dots$, we write \triangleright p_i for **selecting** the *i*-th element s_i and > p^i for the **suffix** starting at position i, $s_i s_{i+1} s_{i+2} \dots$

- 16 -

DK W

Semantics of LTL in Kripke Structures





More examples in the cooker

Specifically, cooking means that first the door is open, then the

 $\blacktriangleright c = (\neg C \land \neg E) \land X(S \land \neg E \land X(H \land \neg E \land F(\neg C \land \neg E))) -$

This is not F c, which says that all paths must eventually

• We cannot express this in LTL; this is a principal limitation.

oven heats up, cooks, then the door is open again, and all

► $c = \neg C \land X(S \land X(H \land F \neg C)) \land G \neg E$ - not quite.

There is at least one path s.t. c holds eventually.

cook (which might be too strong).

▶ If the cooker heats, then is the door closed

 $AG (\neg H \lor C)$

▶ It is always possible that the

cooker will eventually warmup.

 $AG(EF(\neg H \land EX H))$

Question: does the cooker work?

without an error.

better

► So, does the cooker work?

Given a Kripke structure $K = \langle \Sigma, I, \rightarrow, V \rangle$, $s \in \Sigma$, ϕ a CTL-formula, then:

- $K, s \models AF \phi$ iff for all paths p with $p_1 = s$,
- we have $K, p_i \models \phi$ for some i• $K, s \models EF \phi$ iff for some path p with $p_1 = s$,
- $K, s \models \phi AU \psi$ iff for all paths p with $p_1 = s$, • $k, s \models \phi AU \psi$ iff for all paths p with $p_1 = s$,
- $K, s \models \phi A \theta \psi$ in for all paths p with $p_1 = s$, there is i with $K, p_i \models \psi$ and for all $j < i, K, p_j \models \phi$ • $K, s \models \phi E U \psi$ iff for some path p with $p_1 = s$,
- There is i with $K, p_i \models \psi$ and for all $j < i, K, p_j \models \phi$

Systeme hoher Sicherheit und Oualität. WS 17/18

ънÌ.

S, C, ¬H, ¬

- 24

start

LTL, CTL and CTL*

- CTL is more expressive than LTL, but (surprisingly) there are also properties we can express in LTL but not in CTL:
 - The formula (Fφ) → Fψ cannot be expressed in CTL
 "When φ occurs somewhere, then ψ also occurs somewhere."
 - ▶ Not: $AF\phi \rightarrow AF\psi$, nor $AG(\phi \rightarrow AF\psi)$
 - The formula AG ($EF\phi$) cannot be expressed in LTL
 - "For all paths, it is always the case that there is some path on which φ is eventually true."
- CTL* Allow for the use of temporal operators (X, G, F, U) without a directly preceded path quantifiers (A, E)
 - e.g. AGF φ is allowed
- CTL* subsumes both LTL and CTL.

Systeme hoher Sicherheit und Qualität, WS 17/18 * 25 *

DKW

Safety and Liveness Properties

Safety: nothing bad ever happens

- E.g. "x is always not equal 0"
- Safety properties are falsified by a bad (reachable) state
- Safety properties can falsified by a finite prefix of an execution trace

Liveness: something good will eventually happen

- E.g. "system is always terminating"
- Need to keep looking for the good thing forever
- Liveness properties can be falsified by an infinite-suffix of an execution trace: e.g. finite list of states beginning with the initial state followed by a cycle showing you a loop that can cause you to get stuck and never reach the "good thing"

- 27 -

```
Systeme hoher Sicherheit und Qualität, WS 17/18
```

DKW

Complexity and State Explosion

- ▶ Even our small oven example has 6 states with 4 labels each. If we add one integer variable with 32 bits (e.g. for the heat), we get 2³² additional states.
- Theoretically, there is not much hope. The basic problem of deciding whether a formula holds (satisfiability problem) for the temporal logics we have seen has the following complexity:
 - LTL without U is NP-complete;
 - LTL is PSPACE-complete;
 - CTL (and CTL*) are EXPTIME-complete.
- This is known as state explosion.
- But at least it is decidable. Practically, state abstraction is the key technique, so e.g. for an integer variable *i* we identify all states with *i* ≤ 0, and those with 0 < *i*.

Systeme hoher Sicherheit und Qualität, WS 17/18 * 26

Summary

- Model-checking allows us to show to show properties of systems by enumerating the system's states, by modelling systems as finite state machines, and expressing properties in temporal logic.
- We considered Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) and Computational Tree Logic (CTL). LTL allows us to express properties of single paths, CTL allows quantifications over all possible paths of an FSM.
- The basic problem: the system state can quickly get huge, and the basic complexity of the problem is horrendous, leading to so-called state explosion. But the use of abstraction and state compression techniques make model-checking bearable.
- Next week:
 - Practical model-checking (with NuSMV and/or Spin).

- 28 -

```
Systeme hoher Sicherheit und Qualität, WS 17/18
```

DKW

DKW