

Systeme hoher Sicherheit und Qualität Universität Bremen, WS 2017/2018



Lecture 12:

Tools for Model Checking

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Organisatorisches

Wir bieten an folgenden Terminen mündliche Prüfungen an:

- ► Mi, 07.02.2018
- ▶ Do, 15.02.2018
- ► Mi, 28.02.2018

Anmeldung per Mail beim Veranstalter.

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Where are we?

- ▶ 01: Concepts of Quality
- ▶ 02: Legal Requirements: Norms and Standards
- ▶ 03: The Software Development Process
- ▶ 04: Hazard Analysis
- ▶ 05: High-Level Design with SysML
- ▶ 06: Formal Modelling with OCL
- ▶ 07: Testing
- ▶ 08: Static Program Analysis
- ▶ 09: Software Verification with Floyd-Hoare Logic
- ▶ 10: Correctness and Verification Condition Generation
- ▶ 11: Model Checking
- ▶ 12: Tools for Model Checking
- ▶ 13: Conclusions



Introduction

- ▶ In the last lecture, we saw the **basics of model-checking**: how to model systems on an abstract level with FSM or Kripke structures, and how to specify their properties with temporal logic (LTL and
- ▶ This was motivated by the promise of "efficient tool support".
- ▶ So how does this tool support look like, and how does it work? We will hopefully answer these two questions in the following...
- ▶ Brief overview:
 - An Example: The Railway Crossing.
 - Modelchecking with NuSMV and Spin.
 - Algorithms for Model Checking.





The Railway Crossing




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First Abstraction Car Gates

The Model



train # lvng train = lvng

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The Finite State Machine

▶ The states of the FSM is given by mapping variables car, train, gate to the domains

 $\Sigma_{car} = \{appr, xing, lvng, away\}$ $\Sigma_{train} = \{appr, xing, lvng, away\}$

 $\Sigma_{gate} = \{open, clsd\}$

▶ Or alternatively, states are a 3-tuples $s \in \Sigma = \Sigma_{car} \times \Sigma_{train} \times \Sigma_{gate}$

▶ The transition relation is given by

 $\langle away, away, open \rangle \rightarrow \langle appr, away, open \rangle \\ \langle appr, away, open \rangle \rightarrow \langle xing, away, open \rangle$ $\langle appr, appr, clsd \rangle \rightarrow \langle appr, xing, clsd \rangle$ $\langle appr, xing, clsd \rangle \rightarrow \langle appr, lvng, clsd \rangle$

 $\langle appr, lvng, clsd \rangle \rightarrow \langle appr, away, open \rangle$

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Properties of the Railway Crossing

- ▶ We want to express properties such as
 - ▶ Cars and trains may never cross at the same time.
 - ▶ The car can always leave the crossing.
 - Approaching trains may eventually cross.
 - ▶ There are cars crossing the tracks.
- ➤ The first two are safety properties, the last two are liveness properties.
- ► To formulate these in temporal logic, we first need the **basic propositions** which talk about the variables of the state.

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Basic Propositions

► The basic propositions *Prop* are given as equalities over the state variables:

 $\begin{aligned} &(car = v) \in Prop \; \operatorname{mit} \; v \in \Sigma_{car}, \\ &(train = v) \in Prop \; \operatorname{mit} \; v \in \Sigma_{train}, \\ &(gate = v) \in Prop \; \operatorname{mit} \; v \in \Sigma_{gate} \end{aligned}$

▶ The Kripke structure valuation V maps each basic proposition to all states where this equality holds.

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The Properties

- ► Cars and trains never cross at the same time: $G \neg (car = xing \land train = xing)$
- ► A car can always leave the crossing: $G(car = xing \rightarrow F(car = lvng))$
- ► Approaching trains may eventually cross: $G(train = appr \rightarrow F(train = xing))$
- ► There are cars which are crossing the tracks: EF(car = xing)
 - Not expressible in LTL, F(car = xing) means something stronger.

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Model-Checking Tools: NuSMV2

- NuSMV is a reimplementation of SMV, the first model-checker to use BDDs. NuSMV2 also adds SAT-based model checking.
- ➤ Systems are modelled as synchronous FSMs (Mealy automata) or asynchronous processes*.
- ▶ Properties can be formulated in LTL and CTL.
- ▶ Written in C, open source. Latest version 2.6.0 from Oct. 2015.
- ▶ Developed by Fondazione Bruno Kessler, Carnegie Mellon University, the University of Genoa and the University of Trento.
- * This is apparently depreciated now.

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Model-Checking Tools: Spin

- ► Spin was originally developed by Gerard Holzmann at Bell Labs in the 80s.
- ► Systems modelled in Promela (Process Meta Language): asynchronous communication, non-deterministic automata.
- ► Spin translates the automata into a C program, which performs the actual model-checking.
- ▶ Supports LTL and CTL.
- ▶ Latest version 6.4.7 from August 2017.
- ▶ Spin won the ACM System Software Award in 2001.

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Conclusions

- ➤ Tools such as NuSMV2 and Spin make model-checking feasible for moderately sized systems.
- ➤ This allows us to find errors in systems which are hard to find by testing alone.
- ▶ The key ingredient is **efficient state abstraction**.
 - ▶ But careful: **abstraction** must **preserve properties**.

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