

Systeme hoher Sicherheit und Qualität
Universität Bremen, WS 2017/2018

Lecture 1: Introduction and Notions of Quality

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Organisatorisches

Generelles

- ▶ Einführungsvorlesung zum Masterprofil S & Q
- ▶ 6 ETCS-Punkte
- ▶ Vorlesung:
 - ▶ Montag 12 – 14 Uhr (MZH 1110)
- ▶ Übung:
 - ▶ Dienstag 12 – 14 Uhr (MZH 1110)
- ▶ Material (Folien, Artikel, Übungsblätter) auf der Homepage:

<http://www.informatik.uni-bremen.de/~cxl/lehre/ssq.ws17>

Vorlesung

- ▶ Foliensätze als **Kernmaterial**
 - ▶ Sind auf Englisch (Notationen!)
 - ▶ Nach der Vorlesung auf der Homepage verfügbar
- ▶ Ausgewählte Fachartikel als **Zusatzmaterial**
 - ▶ Auf der Homepage verlinkt (ggf. in StudIP)
- ▶ Bücher nur für einzelne Teile der Vorlesung verfügbar:
 - ▶ Nancy Leveson: Engineering a Safer World
 - ▶ Ericson: Hazard Analysis Techniques for System Safety
 - ▶ Nilson, Nilson: Principles of Program Analysis
 - ▶ Winskel: The Formal Semantics of Programming Languages
- ▶ Zum weiteren Stöbern:
 - ▶ Wird im Verlauf der Vorlesung bekannt gegeben

Übungen

- ▶ Übungsblätter:
 - ▶ „Leichtgewichte“ Übungsblätter, die in der Übung bearbeitet und schnell korrigiert werden können.
 - ▶ Übungsblätter vertiefen Vorlesungsstoff.
 - ▶ Bewertung gibt schnell Feedback.
- ▶ Übungsbetrieb:
 - ▶ Gruppen bis zu 3 StudentInnen
 - ▶ Ausgabe der Übungsblätter Dienstag in der Übung
 - ▶ Zeitgleich auf der Homepage
 - ▶ Erstes Übungsblatt: nächste Woche (24.10.2017)
 - ▶ Bearbeitung: während der Übung
 - ▶ Abgabe: bis Dienstag abend

Prüfungsform

- ▶ Bewertung der Übungen:
 - ▶ A (sehr gut (1.0) – nichts zu meckern, nur wenige Fehler)
 - ▶ B (gut (2.0) – kleine Fehler, im großen und ganzen gut)
 - ▶ C (befriedigend (3.0) – größere Fehler oder Mängel)
 - ▶ Nicht bearbeitet (oder zu viele Fehler)

- ▶ Prüfungsleistung:
 - ▶ Teilnahme am Übungsbetrieb (20%)
 - ▶ Übungen keine Voraussetzung
 - ▶ Mündliche Prüfung am Ende des Semesters (80%)
 - ▶ Einzelprüfung, ca. 20- 30 Minuten

Ziel der Vorlesung

- ▶ Methoden und Techniken zur Entwicklung sicherheitskritischer Systeme
- ▶ Überblick über verschiedene Mechanismen d.h. auch Überblick über vertiefende Veranstaltungen
 - ▶ Theorie reaktiver Systeme
 - ▶ Grundlagen der Sicherheitsanalyse und des Designs
 - ▶ Formale Methoden der Softwaretechnik
 - ▶ Einführung in die Kryptographie
 - ▶ Qualitätsorientierter Systementwurf
 - ▶ Test von Schaltungen und Systemen
 - ▶ Informationssicherheit -- Prozesse und Systeme
- ▶ Verschiedene Dimensionen
 - ▶ Hardware vs. Software
 - ▶ Security vs. Safety
 - ▶ Qualität der Garantien

Overview


Objectives

- ▶ This is an introductory lecture for the topics

Quality – Safety – Security

- ▶ Bird's eye view of everything relevant related to the development of systems of high quality, high safety or high security.
- ▶ The lecture reflects the fundamentals of the research focus quality, safety & security at the department of Mathematics and Computer Science (FB3) at the University of Bremen. This is one of the three focal points of computer science at FB3, the other two being Digital Media and Artificial Intelligence, Robotics & Cognition.
- ▶ This lecture is read jointly (and in turns) by Dieter Hutter, Christoph Lüth, and Jan Peleska.
- ▶ The choice of material in each semester reflects personal preferences.

Why bother with Quality, Safety, and Security ?



ECAM 02:10:05

AUTO FLT AP OFF

ECAM 02:10:08

AUTO FLT AP OFF

LAW (T LOST)

.....330/.82

ET FAULT

02:10:15

AP OFF

LOCKED

AUTO FLT

/THR OFF

/THR OFF

S.....MOVE

S.....MOVE

LAW (T LOST)

02:10:24

AUTO FLT AP OFF

AUTO FLT A/THR OFF

F/CTL ALTN LAW (PROT LOST)

-MAX SPEED.....330/.82

F/CTL RUD TRV LIM FAULT

ECAM 02:12:44

AUTO FLT AP OFF

NAV ADR DISAGREE

-AIR SPD.....X CHECK

-IF NO SPD DISAGREE

-AOA DISCREPANCY

-IF SPD DISAGREE

-ADR CHECK PROC...APPLY

F/CTL AUTO FLT


F/CTL AUTO FLT

F/CTL ALTN LAW (PROT LOST)

F/CTL ALTN LAW (PROT LOST)

Flight AF 447

Dec-05										
Date	Item Number	Item	Revised	Insert Fees	Amount Paid for Item	Act. Shipping	Sold \$ Amount	Shipping Paid	Insurance Paid	Total Paid
12/01/2005	1234567890	Enter description of item for your files		\$0.00	\$4.20	\$3.00	\$15.70	\$4.00	\$2.00	\$29.90
12/01/2005	1234567891	Symbiose Niger Lion Oxyth Size 22 MANT	1	\$0.00	\$2.50	\$3.00	\$70.00	\$4.00	\$1.50	\$81.00
12/01/2005	1234567892	Bag Closure Jumper - 1/2" Bot Size 18 M MANT		\$0.00	\$12.00	\$3.00	\$30.72	\$4.00	\$2.00	\$51.72
12/01/2005	1234567893	Bag Closure Jumper - Top Size 22 M MANT	2	\$0.00	\$12.00	\$3.00	\$27.70	\$4.00	\$1.50	\$57.20
12/01/2005	4967890123	New Symbiose Duffel Pkwt. 1kg. Stock, Cap		\$0.00	\$10.00	\$3.00	\$42.00	\$4.00	\$2.00	\$61.00
12/01/2005	9678901234	New Symbiose Duffel Pkwt. 1kg. Stock, Cap		\$0.00	\$10.00	\$3.00	\$43.50	\$4.00	\$2.00	\$62.50



Friday October 7, 2011
By Daily Express Reporter

AN accounting error yesterday forced outsourcing specialist Mouchel into a major profits warning and sparked the resignation of its chief executive.

The connection has timed out

The server at www.cia.gov is taking too long to respond.

- The site could be temporarily unavailable at certain moments.
- If you are unable to load any pages, check your connection.
- If your computer or network is protected by a firewall, you may need to adjust it to access the Web.



CarShark

Nodes

- ECM
- TCM
- EBCM
- Low Speed
- Radio
- TDM

LogWindow

Display Level: WARNING

Done receiving DTCs from 44

Done receiving DTCs from 45

Done receiving DTCs from 47

Done receiving DTCs from 51

Done receiving DTCs from 53

Done receiving DTCs from 4d

Done receiving DTCs from 58

Packet Summary

Log	Sort CAN IDs
0238.097200 0009 ms 00C1 HS STD	30 00 00
0238.097500 0008 ms 00C5 HS STD	00 00 00
0238.095300 0012 ms 00C9 HS STD	00 00 00 07 00 40 08
0238.098800 0010 ms 00F1 HS STD	1C 00 00 40
0238.090800 0012 ms 00F9 HS STD	

Send Packet

Subnet: Low Speed Type: Standard

CAN id: Send Packet

Bytes: Clear Bytes

Read Memory

Device 4d on HS

Start Address:

Length:

Block Size:

File:

Our car



Ariane 5

- ▶ Ariane 5 exploded on its virgin flight (Ariane Flight 501) on 4.6.1996.



- ▶ How could that happen?

What Went Wrong With Ariane Flight 501?

- (1) Self-destruction due to instability;
- (2) Instability due to wrong steering movements (rudder);
- (3) On-board computer tried to compensate for (assumed) wrong trajectory;
- (4) Trajectory was calculated wrongly because own position was wrong;
- (5) Own position was wrong because positioning system had crashed;
- (6) Positioning system had crashed because transmission of sensor data to ground control failed with integer overflow;
- (7) Integer overflow occurred because values were too high;
- (8) Values were too high because positioning system was integrated unchanged from predecessor model, Ariane-4;
- (9) This assumption was not documented because it was satisfied tacitly with Ariane-4.
- (10) Positioning system was redundant, but both systems failed (systematic error).
- (11) Transmission of data to ground control also not necessary.

Railway Accident in Bad Aibling 2016

- ▶ Two trains collided on a single-track line close to Bad Aibling



- ▶ Human error ?
 - cf. Nancy Leveson: Engineering a Safer World



Planes are at risk of cyber attack through their Wi-Fi and entertainment systems, says hacker, prompting fears for aircraft security

- Security researcher Ruben Santamarta says he has figured out how to hack the satellite communications on passenger jets through their WiFi
- Communications can also be hacked through inflight entertainment systems
- Santamarta is scheduled to lay out the technical details of his research at this week's Black Hat hacking conference in Las Vegas

By [REUTERS](#)

PUBLISHED: 19:44 GMT, 4 August 2014 | UPDATED: 10:57 GMT, 5 August 2014

from: Daily Mail Aug. 2014

from: c't 1/2003 (Heise Verlag)

WPA2: Forscher entdecken Schwachstelle...hüßelung | heise Security - Chromium

WPA2: Forscher entde... x WPA2 security in trou... x

Secure | <https://www.heise.de/security/meldung/WPA2-F...>

Apps Online Footie Funnies Live Feeds

heise Security News ▾ Hintergrund Foren Events

Security > News > 7-Tage-News > 2017 > KW 42 > WPA2: Forscher entdecken Schwachstelle in WLAN-Verschlüsselung

WPA2: Forscher entdecken Schwachstelle in WLAN-Verschlüsselung

16.10.2017 11:02 Uhr - Dennis Schirmmacher vorlesen



Sicherheitsforscher haben offenbar kritische Lücken im Sicherheitsstandard WPA2 entdeckt. Sie geben an, dass sich so Verbindungen belauschen lassen.

Mehrere Sicherheitslücken bedrohen den Sicherheitsstandard WPA2, der WLAN-Verbindungen absichert und Lauscher aussperrt. Mittels der KRACK getauften Attacke sollen Angreifer WPA2 aufbrechen, belauschen und manipulieren können, warnen diverse Sicherheitsforscher. Das geht aus [verschiedenen Medienberichten hervor](#).

Frisch auf den Tisch, ein Evergreen zum Thema „Sicherheitslücken in täglich genutzten Protokollen...“

[Heise Security](#), 17.10.2017

What is Safety and Security?

▶ Safety:

- ▶ product achieves acceptable levels of risk or harm to people, business, software, property or the environment in a specified context of use
- ▶ Threats from “inside”
 - ▶ Avoid malfunction of a system (e.g. planes, cars, railways...)

▶ Security:


- ▶ Product is protected against potential attacks from people, environment etc.
- ▶ Threats from “outside”
 - ▶ Analyze and counteract the abilities of an attacker

Software Development Models


► Definition of software development process and documents

► Examples:

- Waterfall Model
- V-Model
- Model-Driven Architectures
- Agile Development



Formal Software Development



Verification and Validation

- ▶ **Verification:** have we built the system right?
 - ▶ i.e. correct with respect to a reference artefact
 - ▶ specification document
 - ▶ reference system
 - ▶ Model

- ▶ **Validation:** have we built the right system
 - ▶ i.e. adequate for its intended operation?

V&V Methods

▶ **Testing**

- ▶ Test case generation, black- vs. white box
- ▶ Hardware-in-the-loop testing: integrated HW/SW system is tested
- ▶ Software-in-the-loop testing: only software is tested
- ▶ Program runs using symbolic values

▶ **Simulation**

- ▶ An executable model is tested with respect to specific properties
- ▶ This is also called Model-in-the-Loop Test

▶ Static/dynamic **program analysis**

- ▶ Dependency graphs, flow analysis
- ▶ Symbolic evaluation

▶ **Model checking**

- ▶ Automatic proof by reduction to finite state problem

▶ **Formal Verification**

- ▶ Symbolic proof of program properties

Where are we?

- ▶ 01: Concepts of Quality
- ▶ 02: Legal Requirements: Norms and Standards
- ▶ 03: The Software Development Process
- ▶ 04: Hazard Analysis
- ▶ 05: High-Level Design with SysML
- ▶ 06: Formal Modelling with OCL
- ▶ 07: Testing
- ▶ 08: Static Program Analysis
- ▶ 09-10: Software Verification
- ▶ 11-12: Model Checking
- ▶ 13: Conclusions

Concepts of Quality

What is Quality?

- ▶ Quality is the collection of its characteristic properties
- ▶ Quality model: decomposes the high-level definition by associating attributes (also called characteristics, factors, or **criteria**) to the quality conception
- ▶ Quality **indicators** associate **metric values** with **quality criteria**, expressing “how well” the criteria have been fulfilled by the process or product.
 - ▶ The idea is that to **measure** quality, with the aim of continuously **improving** it.



Quality Criteria: Different „Dimensions“ of Quality

- ▶ For the development of artifacts quality criteria can be measured with respect to the
 - ▶ development process (**process quality**)
 - ▶ final product (**product quality**)
- ▶ Another dimension for structuring quality conceptions is
 - ▶ **Correctness**: the consistency with the product and its associated requirements specifications
 - ▶ **Effectiveness**: the suitability of the product for its intended purpose


Quality Criteria (cont.)

- ▶ A third dimension structures quality according to product properties:
 - ▶ **Functional properties:** the specified services to be delivered to the users
 - ▶ **Structural properties:** architecture, interfaces, deployment, control structures
 - ▶ **Non-functional properties:** usability, safety, reliability, availability, security, maintainability, guaranteed worst-case execution time (WCET), costs, absence of run-time errors, ...

Quality (ISO/IEC 25010/12)


- ▶ “Systems and software engineering — Systems and software Quality Requirements and Evaluation (SQuaRE) — System and software quality models”
 - ▶ Quality model framework (replaces the older ISO/IEC 9126)
- ▶ Product quality model
 - ▶ Categorizes system/software product quality properties
- ▶ Quality in use model
 - ▶ Defines characteristics related to outcomes of interaction with a system
- ▶ Quality of data model
 - ▶ Categorizes data quality attributes

Product Quality Model



Source: ISO/IEC FDIS 25010


Our Focus of Interest



How can we „guarantee“ safety and security ?


Source: ISO/IEC FDIS 25010

System Quality Life Cycle Model



Source: ISO/IEC FDIS 25010

Quality in Use Model



Other Norms and Standards

- ▶ ISO 9001 (DIN ISO 9000-4):
 - ▶ Standardizes definition and supporting principles necessary for a quality system to ensure products meet requirements
 - ▶ “Meta-Standard”

- ▶ CMM (Capability Maturity Model), Spice (ISO 15504)
 - ▶ Standardizes maturity of development process
 - ▶ Level 1 (initial): Ad-hoc
 - ▶ Level 2 (repeatable): process dependent on individuals
 - ▶ Level 3 (defined): process defined & institutionalized
 - ▶ Level 4 (managed): measured process
 - ▶ Level 5 (optimizing): improvement feed back into process

Summary

- ▶ Quality
 - ▶ collection of characteristic properties
 - ▶ quality indicators measuring quality criteria

- ▶ Relevant aspects of quality here
 - ▶ Functional suitability
 - ▶ Reliability
 - ▶ Security

- ▶ Next week
 - ▶ Concepts of Safety, Legal Requirements, Certification