

iteme hoher Sicherheit und Qualität, WS 19/20

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
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## Model-Driven Development (MDD, MDE)

- Describe problems on abstract level using a modeling language (often a domain-specific language), and derive implementation by model transformation or run-time interpretation.
- Often used with UML (or its DSLs, eg. SysML)



Strictly sequential development

Drawbacks: high initial investment, limited, reverse engineering and change management (code changes to model changes) is complex

\* Proprietary DSL - not related to UML

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## V-Model

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Evolution of the waterfall model: Each phase supported by corresponding verification & validation phase Feedback between next and previous phase Standard model for public projects in Germany ... but also a general term for models of this "shape" Current: V-Modell XT ("extreme tailoring") Shape gives depencies, not development sequence Validated w.r.t. completeness, verified w.r.t. Review/Tes consistency High Lev Desig

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
# Agile Methods

- Prototype-driven development
  - E.g. Rapid Application Development Development as a sequence of prototypes
  - Ever-changing safety and security requirements
- Agile programming
  - E.g. Scrum, extreme programming
  - Development guided by functional requirements
  - Process structured by rules of conduct for developers
  - Rules capture best practice
  - Less support for non-functional requirements


## Test-driven development

- Tests as executable specifications: write tests first
- Often used together with the other two

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


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#### Auditability and Accountability Traceability Version control and configuration management is mandatory in safety-critical development (auditability). > The idea of being able to follow requirements (in particular, safety requirements) from requirement spec to the code (and possibly back). On the simplest level, an Excel sheet with (manual) links to the program. Keeping track of all artifacts contributing to a particular instance (build) of the system (configuration), and their versions. More sophisticated tools include DOORS: Decompose requirements, hierarchical requirements Two-way traceability: from code, test cases, test procedures, and test Repository keeps all artifacts in all versions. results back to requirements Centralised: one repository vs. distributed (every developer keeps own repository) E.g. DO-178B requires all code derives from requirements General model: check out - modify - commit Concurrency: enforced lock, or merge after commit. The SysML modelling language has traceability support: Each model element can be traced to a requirement. Well-known systems: Special associations to express traceability relations. Commercial: ClearCase, Perforce, Bitkeeper... Open Source: Subversion (centralised); Git, Mercurial (distributed)

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


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Closure Predicates

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Observational

determinism

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
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
Each observation can be explained by a system G satisfying L


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#### Examples:


- Average response time
- Closure operations in information flow control
- Fair scheduling











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












Satisfies

 $\begin{array}{l} \mathsf{empty} \mapsto [] \\ \mathsf{push} \quad \mapsto (:) \\ \mathsf{pop} \quad \mapsto \mathsf{safetail} \end{array}$ 

To prove:

safetail([]) == []
safetail(y:xs) == y

Refinement preserves properties of stack by transitivity of the logic !

Concurrent shared variable programs are non-

From abstract specification to an implementation

- What do we want to refine?
  - Algorithm: algebraic refinement

Vertical Structuring - Refinement

Idea: start at an abstract description and add step by step

- Data: data refinement
- Process: process refinement
- Events: action refinement

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## **Even More Refinements**

- Data refinement
  - Abstract datatype is "implemented" in terms of the more concrete datatype

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- Simple example: define stack with lists
- Process refinement
  - Process is refined by excluding certain runs
  - Refinement as a reduction of underspecification by eliminating possible behaviours
- Action refinement
  - Action is refined by a sequence of actions
  - E.g. a stub for a procedure is refined to an executable procedure

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details

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- tailSafe xs = if null xs then [] else tail xs e hoher Sicherheit und Oualität. WS 19/20 DKW Conclusion & Summary ▶ Software development models: structure vs. flexibility ▶ Safety standards such as IEC 61508, DO-178B suggest development according to V-model. Specification and implementation linked by verification and validation. Variety of artefacts produced at each stage, which have to be subjected to external review. ► Safety / Security Requirements Properties: sets of traces Hyperproperties: sets of properties Structuring of the development:

Refinement

[] :: [a] head :: [a]-> a (:) :: a-> [a]-> [a] tailSafe :: [a]-> [a]

Implementing stacks by lists

List

- ► Horizontal e.g. composition
- Vertical refinement (e.g. algebraic, data, process...)

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