

Systeme hoher Sicherheit und Qualität

WS 2019/2020



Lecture 11:

Foundations of Model Checking

Christoph Lüth, Dieter Hutter, Jan Peleska

ysteme hoher Sicherheit und Qualität, WS 19/20

Introduction

- ▶ In the last lectures, we were verifying program properties with the Floyd-Hoare calculus (or verification condition generation). Program verification translates the question of program correctness into a **proof** in program logic (the Floyd-Hoare logic), turning it into a deductive
- ▶ Model-checking takes a different approach: instead of directly working with the (source code) of the program, we work with an **abstraction** of the system (the system **model**). Because we build an abstraction, this approach is also applicable at higher verification levels. (It is also complimentary to deductive verification.)
- ▶ The key questions are: how do these models look like? What properties do we want to express, and how do we express and prove them?

Introduction

- ▶ Model checking operates on (abstract) state machines
 - Does an abstract system satisfy some behavioral property e.g. liveness (deadlock) or safety properties
 - consider traffic lights in Requirement Engineering
 - Example: "green must always follow red"
- ▶ Automatic analysis if state machine is finite
 - Push-button technology
 - User does not need to know logic (at least not for the proof)
- ▶ Basis is satisfiability of boolean formula in a finite domain (SAT). However, finiteness does not imply efficiency – all interesting problems are at least NP-complete, and SAT is no exception (Cook's theorem).



Finite State Machine (FSM)

Definition: Finite State Machine (FSM)

A FSM is given by $\mathcal{M} = \langle \Sigma, I, \rightarrow \rangle$ where

- Σ is a finite set of **states**,
- $I \subseteq \Sigma$ is a set of **initial** states, and
- \rightarrow ⊆ Σ × Σ is a **transition relation**, s.t. \rightarrow is left-total: $\forall s \in \Sigma. \exists s' \in \Sigma. s \rightarrow s'$
- ▶ Variations of this definition exists, e.g. no initial states.
- ▶ Note there is no final state, and no input or output (this is the key difference to automata).
- ightharpoonup If ightharpoonup is a function, the FSM is deterministic, otherwise it is non-deterministic.

DK W

Where are we?


- 01: Concepts of Quality
- 02: Legal Requirements: Norms and Standards
- 03: The Software Development Process
- 04: Hazard Analysis
- 05: High-Level Design with SysML
- 06: Formal Modelling with OCL
- 07: Testing
- 08: Static Program Analysis
- 09: Software Verification with Floyd-Hoare Logic
- 10: Verification Condition Generation

11: Foundations of Model Checking

- 12: Tools for Model Checking
- 13: Conclusions

Systeme hoher Sicherheit und Qualität, WS 19/20





The Model-Checking Problem

The Basic Question:

Given a model ${\mathcal M}$ and property ϕ , we want to know if

$$\mathcal{M} \models \phi$$

- ▶ What is \mathcal{M} ?
 - A finite-state machine or Kripke structure.
- ▶ What is ϕ ?
- Temporal logic
- ► How to prove it?
 - By enumerating the states and thus construct a model (hence the term model checking)
 - ► The basic problem: state explosion

Systeme hoher Sicherheit und Qualität, WS 19/20



First Example: A Simple Drink Dispenser

- 1) Insert a coin.
- Press button: tea or coffee
- Tea or coffee dispensed
- 4) Back to 1)


FSM:

$$\Sigma = \{\,s_0, s_1, s_2, s_3\,\}$$


$$I = \{ s_0 \}$$

$$\rightarrow = \begin{cases} (s_0, s_1), (s_1, s_2), (s_2, s_3), \\ (s_1, s_3), (s_2, s_0), (s_3, s_0) \end{cases}$$

Note operation names are for decoration purposes only.



Systeme hoher Sicherheit und Qualität, WS 19/20



Questions to ask

We want to answer questions about the system behaviour like

- ▶ Can the cooker heat with the door open?
- ▶ When the start button is pushed, will the cooker eventually heat up?
- ▶ When the cooker is correctly started, will the cooker eventually heat up?
- ▶ When an error occurs, will it be still possible to cook?

We are interested in questions on the development of the system over time, i.e. possible traces of the system given by a succession of states.

The tool to formalize and answer these questions is **temporal logic**.

Systeme hoher Sicherheit und Qualität, WS 19/20



Temporal Logic

Expresses properties of possible succession of states

Linear Time


- Every moment in time has a unique successor
- Infinite sequences of moments
- Linear Temporal Logic LTL





Branching Time

- Every moment in time has several successors
- Infinite tree
- Computational Tree Logic CTL



Kripke Structures

▶ In order to talk about propositions, we label the states of a FSM with propositions which hold there. This is called a Kripke structure.

Definition: Kripke structure

Given a set *Prop* of **propositions**, then a Kripke structure is given by

- $K = \langle \Sigma, I, \rightarrow, V \rangle$ where
- Σ is a finite set of states,
- I ⊆ Σ is a set of initial states,
 →⊆ Σ × Σ is a left-total transition relation, and
- $V: Prop \to 2^\Sigma$ is a valuation function mapping propositions to the set of states in which they hold
- ▶ Equivalent formulation: for each state, set of propositions which hold in this state, i.e. $V': \Sigma \to 2^{Prop}$





- ► Example: Cooker
- ▶ Propositions:
 - Cooker is starting: S
 - Door is closed: C
 - Cooker is hot:
 - Error occurred: F
- ► Kripke structure:
- $\blacktriangleright \quad \Sigma = \{s_1, \dots, s_6\}$
 - $I = \{s_1\}$

 $\rightarrow = \{(s_1, s_2), (s_2, s_5), (s_5, s_2), (s_1, s_3) \\ (s_3, s_1), (s_3, s_6), (s_6, s_4), (s_4, s_4), (s_6, s_8), (s_6, s_8), (s_8, s_8)$ $(s_4, s_3), (s_4, s_1)$

 $V(S) = \{s_2, s_5, s_6\},\$ $V(C) = \{s_3, s_4, s_5, s_6\},\$ $V(H) = \{s_4\}, V(E) = \{s_2, s_5\}$

Systeme hoher Sicherheit und Qualität, WS 19/20

start

Semantics of Kripke Structures (Prop)

- ▶ We now want to define a logic in which we can formalize temporal statements, i.e. statements about the behaviour of the system and its changes over time.
- ▶ The basis is **open propositional logic** (PL): negation, conjunction, disjunction, implication*.
- lacktriangle With that, we define how a PL-formula ϕ holds in a Kripke structure $\it K$ at state s, written as $K, s \models \phi$.
- ▶ Let $K = (\Sigma, I, \rightarrow, V)$ be a Kripke structure, $s \in \Sigma$, and ϕ a formula of propositional logic, then

if $p \in Prop$ and $s \in V(p)$

 \triangleright $K, s \models \neg \phi$

if not $K, s \models \phi$

 \triangleright $K, s \models \phi_1 \land \phi_2$

if $K, s \models \phi_1$ and $K, s \models \phi_2$

if $K, s \models \phi_1$ or $K, s \models \phi_2$ \triangleright $K, s \models \phi_1 \lor \phi_2$ * Note implication is derived: $\phi_1 \rightarrow \phi_2 = \neg \phi_1 \lor \phi_2$

Linear Temporal Logic

- ▶ The formulae of LTL are given as
- $\phi ::= p \mid \neg \phi \mid \phi_1 \land \phi_2 \mid \phi_1 \lor \phi_2$ $\mid X \phi \mid G \phi \mid F \phi \mid \phi_1 U \phi_2$

Propositional formulae Temporal operators

▶ X p: in the next moment p holds



▶ G p: p holds in all moments



▶ F p: there is a moment in the future when p will hold

▶ p U q: p holds in all moments until q holds



e hoher Sicherheit und Qualität, WS 19/20



Examples of LTL formulae

▶ If the cooker heats, then is the door closed?

 $G(H \to C)$

▶ Is it always possible to recover from an error?

 $G(E \rightarrow F \neg E)$

Need to add a transition.

▶ Is it always possible to cook (heat up, then cook)?

 $F(S \rightarrow XC)$

- Always possible to "avoid" cooking.
- Cannot express "there are paths in which we can always cook".

me hoher Sicherheit und Qualität, WS 19/20



Paths in an FSM/Kripke Structure

- ▶ A path in an FSM (or Kripke structure) is a sequence of states starting in one of the initial states and connected by the transition relation (essentially, a run of the system).
- ▶ Formally: for an FSM $M = \langle \Sigma, I, \rightarrow \rangle$ or a Kripke structure $K = \langle \Sigma, I, \rightarrow, V \rangle$, a **path** is given by a sequence $s_1s_2s_3 ... \in \Sigma^*$ such that $s_1 \in I$ and $s_i \to s_{i+1}$.
- ▶ For a path $p = s_1 s_2 s_3 ...$, we write
 - $ightharpoonup p_i$ for **selecting** the *i*-th element s_i and
 - $ightharpoonup p^i$ for the **suffix** starting at position i, $s_i s_{i+1} s_{i+2} \dots$

ysteme hoher Sicherheit und Qualität, WS 19/20

More examples for the cooker

- Question: does the cooker work?
- ▶ Specifically, cooking means that first the door is open, then the oven heats up, cooks, then the door is open again, and all without an error.
 - $c = \neg C \land X(S \land X(H \land F \neg C)) \land G \neg E \text{not quite.}$
 - $c = (\neg C \land \neg E) \land X(S \land \neg E \land X(H \land \neg E \land F(\neg C \land \neg E))) \text{better}$
- So, does the cooker work?
 - ▶ There is at least one path s.t. c holds eventually.
 - $\blacktriangleright\,$ This is not G F c, which says that all paths must eventually cook (which might be too strong).
 - We cannot express this in LTL: this is a principal limitation.



Temporal operators

Computational Tree Logic (CTL)

- ▶ The formulae of CTL are given as
 - $\phi ::= p \mid \neg \phi \mid \phi_1 \land \phi_2 \mid \phi_1 \lor \phi_2$ Propositional formulae $|AX \phi|EX \phi|AG \phi|EG \phi$ $\mid AF \phi \mid EF \phi \mid \phi_1 AU \phi_2 \mid \phi_1 EU \phi_2$
- ▶ Note that CTL formulae can be considered to be a LTL formulae with a **modality** (A or E) added to each temporal operator.
 - ► Generally speaking, the A modality says the temporal operator holds for all paths, and the E modality says it only holds for all least one path.
- ightharpoonup Hence, we do not define a **satisfaction** for a single path p, but with respect to a specific state in an FSM.



Semantics of CTL in Kripke Structures

For a Kripke structure $K = \langle \Sigma, I, \rightarrow, V \rangle$ and a CTL-formula ϕ , we say $K \models \phi$ (ϕ **holds** in K) if $K, s \models \phi$ for all $s \in I$, where $K, s \models \phi$ is defined inductively as follows (omitting the clauses for propositional operators p, \neg, \land, \lor):

- $K, s \models AX \phi$ iff for all s' with $s \rightarrow s'$, we have $K, s' \models \phi$
- $K, s \models EX \phi$ iff for some s' with $s \rightarrow s'$, we have $K, s' \models \phi$
- $K, s \models AG \phi$ iff for all paths p with $p_1 = s$,
 - we have $K, p_i \models \phi$ for all $i \ge 2$.
- $K, s \models EG \ \phi$ iff for some path p with $p_1 = s$, we have $K, p_i \models \phi$ for all $i \ge 2$.
- iff for all paths p with $p_1 = s$, $K, s \models AF \phi$
 - we have $K, p_i \models \phi$ for some i
- $K.s \models EF \phi$ iff for some path p with $p_1 = s$,
- we have $K, p_i \models \phi$ for some i
- $K,s \vDash \phi \ AU \ \psi \quad \text{iff for all paths } p \ \text{with } p_1 = s, \\ \text{there is i with } K,p_i \vDash \psi \ \text{and for all } j < i,K,p_j \vDash \phi$
- $K,s \vDash \phi \ EU \ \psi$ iff for some path p with $p_1 = s$, there is i with $K,p_i \vDash \psi$ and for all $j < i,K,p_j \vDash \phi$

DK W

Semantics of LTL in Kripke Structures

Let $K = \langle \Sigma, I, \rightarrow, V \rangle$ be a Kripke Structure and ϕ an LTL formula, then we say $K \models$ ϕ (ϕ holds in K), if $K, s \models \phi$ for all paths $s = s_1 s_2 s_3 \dots$ in K, where:

- $K, s \models p$ if $p \in Prop$, $s_1 \in V(p)$ $k, s \models \neg \phi$ if not $K, s \models \phi$
- $K, s \models \phi_1 \land \phi_2$ if $K, s \models \phi_1$ and $K, s \models \phi_2$ \triangleright $K, s \models \phi_1 \lor \phi_2$ if $K, s \models \phi_1$ or $K, s \models \phi_2$
- \triangleright $K.s \models X \phi$ if $K, s^2 \models \phi$
- if K, $s^n \models \phi$ for all n > 0 $ightharpoonup K, s \vDash G \phi$ \triangleright $K, s \models F \phi$ if $K, s^n \models \phi$ for some n > 0
- if $K, s^n \models \psi$ for some n > 0, \triangleright $K.s \models \phi U \psi$ and for all i, 0 < i < n, we have $K, s^i \models \phi$

Systeme hoher Sicherheit und Qualität, WS 19/20



Computational Tree Logic (CTL)

- ▶ LTL does not allow us the quantify over paths, e.g. assert the existence of a path satisfying a particular property.
- ▶ To a limited degree, we can solve this problem by negation: instead of asserting a property ϕ , we check whether $\neg \phi$ is satisfied; if that is not the case, ϕ holds. But this does not work for mixtures of universal and existential
- ▶ Computational Tree Logic (CTL) is another temporal logic which allows this by adding universal and existential quantifiers to the modal operators.
- ▶ The name comes from considering paths in the computational tree obtained by unwinding the transition relation of the Kripke structure.





Computational Tree Logic (CTL)

- ▶ Specifying possible paths by combination
 - Branching behavior All paths: A, exists path: E
 - Succession of states in a path Temporal operators X, G, F, U



- ▶ For example:
 - AX p: in all paths the next state satisfies p
 - EX p: there is an path in which the next state satisfies p
 - p AU q : in all paths p holds as long as q does not hold
 - ▶ EF p: there is an path in which eventually p holds



Examples of CTL propositions

▶ If the cooker is hot, then is the door closed


 $AG(H \rightarrow C)$

▶ It is always possible to eventually cook (heat is on), and then eventually get the food (i.e. the door is open afterwards):

 $AF (H \rightarrow AF \neg C)$

▶ It is always possible that the cooker will eventually warmup

 $AG(EF(\neg H \land EX H))$



Systeme hoher Sicherheit und Qualität, WS 19/20

LTL, CTL and CTL*

- ▶ CTL is more expressive than LTL, but (surprisingly) there are also properties we can express in LTL but not in CTL:
 - ▶ The formula $(F\phi) \rightarrow F\psi$ cannot be expressed in CTL
 - "When ϕ occurs somewhere, then ψ also occurs somewhere."
 - Not: $(AF\phi) \rightarrow AF\psi$, nor $AG(\phi \rightarrow AF\psi)$
 - ▶ The formula AG ($EF\phi$) cannot be expressed in LTL
 - "For all paths, it is always the case that there is some path on which ϕ is eventually true."
- ► CTL* Allow for the use of temporal operators (X, G, F, U) without a directly preceding path quantifier (A, E)
 - e.g. AGF φ is allowed
- ► CTL* subsumes both LTL and CTL.

ysteme hoher Sicherheit und Qualität, WS 19/20



Complexity and State Explosion

- ▶ Even our small oven example has 6 states with 4 labels each. If we add one integer variable with 32 bits (e.g. for the heat), we get 2^{32} additional states.
- ▶ Theoretically, there is not much hope. The basic problem of deciding whether a formula holds (satisfiability problem) for the temporal logics we have seen has the following complexity:
 - LTL without U is NP-complete;
 - LTL is PSPACE-complete:
 - ► CTL (and CTL*) are EXPTIME-complete.
- ► This is known as state explosion.
- ▶ But at least it is **decidable**. Practically, state abstraction is the key technique, so e.g. for an integer variable i we identify all states with $i \le 0$, and those with

Systeme hoher Sicherheit und Qualität, WS 19/20





Safety and Liveness Properties

- ► Safety: nothing bad ever happens
 - ▶ E.g. "x is always not equal 0"
 - Safety properties are falsified by a bad (reachable) state
 - Safety properties can falsified by a finite prefix of an execution
- \blacktriangleright Liveness: something good will eventually happen
 - E.g. "system is always terminating"
 - Need to keep looking for the good thing forever
 - Liveness properties can be falsified by an infinite-suffix of an execution trace: e.g. finite list of states beginning with the initial state followed by a *cycle* showing you a loop that can cause you to get stuck and never reach the "good thing"





Summary

- Model-checking allows us to show to show properties of systems by enumerating the system's states, by modelling systems as finite state machines, and expressing properties in temporal logic.
- ▶ Note difference to deductive verification (Floyd-Hoare logic): that uses the source code as the basis, here we need to construct a model of the system.
 - The model can be wrong on the other hand we can construct the model and check properties before even building the system.
 - Model checking is complementary to deductive verification.
- ▶ We considered Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) and Computational Tree Logic (CTL). LTL allows us to express properties of single paths, CTL allows quantifications over all possible paths of an FSM.
- ▶ The basic problem: the system state can quickly get huge, and the basic complexity of the problem is horrendous, leading to so-called **state explosion**. But the use of abstraction and state compression techniques make model-checking bearable.
- Next week: tools for model checking.

Systeme hoher Sicherheit und Qualität, WS 19/20



