

Systeme hoher Sicherheit und Qualität

WS 2019/2020



Lecture 12:

Tools for Model Checking

Christoph Lüth, Dieter Hutter, Jan Peleska

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- ▶ 01: Concepts of Quality

- ▶ 04: Hazard Analysis
- 05: High-Level Design with SysML
- ▶ 06: Formal Modelling with OCL

- ▶ 09: Software Verification with Floyd-Hoare Logic
- ▶ 10: Verification Condition Generation
- ▶ 11: Foundations of Model Checking
- ▶ 12: Tools for Model Checking
- ▶ 13: Conclusions

Organisatorisches

- ► Prüfungstermine
 - ▶ 06.03.2020, 12- 18 Uhr
 - ▶ 02.04.2020, ganztägig
- ► Scheinbedingungen:
 - Note aus der mündlichen Prüfung
 - ▶ Benotung der Übungsblätter: A = 1.3, B = 2.3, C = 3.3
 - Kann als Bonus (nicht Malus) mit 20% hinzugerechnet werden.

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Where are we?

- ▶ 02: Legal Requirements: Norms and Standards
- ▶ 03: The Software Development Process

- ▶ 07: Testing
- ▶ 08: Static Program Analysis



Introduction

- ▶ In the last lecture, we saw the basics of model-checking: how to model systems on an abstract level with FSM or Kripke structures, and how to specify their properties with temporal logic (LTL and
- ▶ This was motivated by the promise of "efficient tool support".
- ▶ So how does this tool support look like, and how does it work? We will hopefully answer these two questions in the following..
- ▶ Brief overview:
 - An Example: The Railway Crossing.
 - Modelchecking with NuSMV and Spin.
 - Algorithms for Model Checking.







The Railway Crossing



The Model






States of the gate:



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The Finite State Machine

▶ The states of the FSM is given by mapping variables car, train, gate to the domains

> $\Sigma_{car} = \{appr, xing, lvng, away\}$
> $$\begin{split} & \Sigma_{train} = \{appr, xing, lvng, away\} \\ & \Sigma_{gate} = \{open, clsd\} \end{split}$$

▶ Or alternatively, states are a 3-tuples

 $s \in \Sigma = \Sigma_{car} \times \Sigma_{train} \times \Sigma_{gate}$

▶ The transition relation is given by $\langle away, away, open \rangle \rightarrow \langle appr, away, open \rangle$ $(away, away, open) \rightarrow (appr, away, open)$ $(appr, away, open) \rightarrow (xing, away, open)$ $(appr, appr, clsd) \rightarrow (appr, xing, clsd)$ $(appr, xing, clsd) \rightarrow (appr, lvng, clsd)$ $(appr, lvng, clsd) \rightarrow (appr, away, open)$



Properties of the Railway Crossing

- ▶ We want to express properties such as
 - Cars and trains may never cross at the same time.
 - ▶ The car can always leave the crossing.
 - Approaching trains may eventually cross.
 - It is possible for cars to cross the tracks.
- ▶ The first two are **safety properties**, the last two are **liveness properties**.
- ▶ To formulate these in temporal logic, we first need the **basic propositions** which talk about the variables of the state.

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Basic Propositions

- ▶ The basic propositions *Prop* are given as equalities over the state variables:
 - $(car = v) \in Prop \text{ mit } v \in \Sigma_{car}, \ (train = v) \in Prop \text{ mit } v \in \Sigma_{train},$ $(gate = v) \in Prop mit \ v \in \Sigma_{gate}$
- \blacktriangleright The Kripke structure valuation V maps each basic proposition to all states where this equality holds.

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The Properties

- ▶ Cars and trains never cross at the same time: $G_{\neg}(\ car = xing \land train = xing)$
- ▶ A car can always leave the crossing:

 $G\left(car = xing \rightarrow F\left(car = lvng\right)\right)$

▶ Approaching trains may eventually cross:

 $G(train = appr \rightarrow F(train = xing))$

▶ There are cars which are crossing the tracks:

ightharpoonup Not expressible in LTL, F(car = xing) means something stronger ("there is always a car which eventually crosses")





Model-Checking Tools: NuSMV2

- NuSMV is a reimplementation of SMV, the first model-checker to use BDDs. NuSMV2 also adds SAT-based model checking.
- ▶ Systems are modelled as synchronous FSMs (Mealy automata) or asynchronous
- ▶ Properties can be formulated in LTL and CTL.
- ▶ Written in C, open source. Latest version 2.6.0 from Oct. 2015.
- ▶ Developed by Fondazione Bruno Kessler, Carnegie Mellon University, the University of Genoa and the University of Trento.
- * This is apparently depreciated now.





Model-Checking Tools: Spin

- ▶ Spin was originally developed by Gerard Holzmann at Bell Labs in the 80s.
- ► Systems modelled in Promela (Process Meta Language): asynchronous communication, non-deterministic automata.
- ▶ Spin translates the automata into a C program, which performs the actual model-checking.
- ▶ Supports LTL and CTL.
- ▶ Latest version 6.4.7 from August 2017.
- ▶ Spin won the ACM System Software Award in 2001.

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Conclusions

- ► Tools such as **NuSMV2** and **Spin** make model-checking feasible for moderately sized systems.
- ▶ This allows us to find errors in systems which are hard to find by testing alone.
- ▶ The key ingredient is **efficient state abstraction**.
 - But careful: abstraction must preserve properties.

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