

From syllogism to common sense:
a tour through the logical landscape

Propositional logic 3

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And now . . .

- 1 What happened last time?
- 2 A calculus of natural deduction
- 3 Hilbert calculi

Semantic equivalence and normal forms

- $\alpha \equiv \beta$ if $w\alpha = w\beta$ for all w
- Replacement Theorem: if $\alpha \equiv \alpha'$ then $\varphi[\alpha'/\alpha] \equiv \varphi$,
i.e., if a subformula α of φ is replaced by $\alpha' \equiv \alpha$ in φ ,
then the resulting formula is equivalent to φ
- Negation normal form (NNF) is established by
“pulling negation inwards”, interchanging \wedge and \vee
- Disjunctive normal form (DNF) of fct f is established by
describing all lines with function value 1 in truth table
- Conjunctive normal form (CNF): analogous, dual

Functional completeness and duality

- Signature S is functional complete:
every Boolean fct is represented by some fma in S
 - Examples: $\{\neg, \wedge\}$, $\{\neg, \vee\}$, $\{\rightarrow, 0\}$, $\{\uparrow\}$, $\{\downarrow\}$
 - Counterexample: $\{\rightarrow, \wedge, \vee\}$
- Dual formula: interchange \wedge and \vee
- Dual function: negate arguments and function value
- Duality theorem: If α represents f , then α^δ represents f^δ .

Tautologies etc.

- α is a **tautology** if $w \models \alpha$ ($w\alpha = 1$) for *all* w
- α is **satisfiable** if $w \models \alpha$ for *some* w
- α is a **contradiction** if α is not satisfiable
- Satisfiability can be decided in nondeterministic polynomial time (NP) and is NP-hard.
- Analogous for tautology property: coNP-complete
- α is a **logical consequence** of X ($X \models \alpha$)
if $\forall w(w \models X \Rightarrow w \models \alpha)$
- \models enjoys certain general properties

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What's in this section?

We want to ...

- find a means to “compute” \models *syntactically*:
- define a derivability relation \vdash by means of a calculus that operates solely on the structure of formulas
- prove that \vdash and \models are identical

The \vdash calculus is of the Gentzen type

(Gerhard Gentzen, 1909–1945, German mathematician/logician, GÖ, Prague)

Basic notation

- Again, use α for formulas and X for sets thereof
- Write $X \vdash \alpha$ to denote: “ α is derivable from X ”
- Gentzen called the pairs (X, α) in the \vdash -relation **sequents**
- **sequent calculus** consists of 6 **basic rules** (for $\{\wedge, \neg\}$) of the form

$$\frac{\text{premise}}{\text{conclusion}}$$

The basic rules

(IS) $\frac{}{\alpha \vdash \alpha}$ (initial sequent)	(MR) $\frac{X \vdash \alpha}{X' \vdash \alpha}$ ($X' \supseteq X$),
(\wedge 1) $\frac{X \vdash \alpha, \beta}{X \vdash \alpha \wedge \beta}$	(\wedge 2) $\frac{X \vdash \alpha \wedge \beta}{X \vdash \alpha, \beta}$
(\neg 1) $\frac{X \vdash \alpha, \neg \alpha}{X \vdash \beta}$	(\neg 2) $\frac{X, \alpha \vdash \beta \mid X, \neg \alpha \vdash \beta}{X \vdash \beta}$

From W. Rautenberg: A Concise Introduction to Mathematical Logic, Springer, 2010.

- use convenience notation as for \models , see Slide 48 (last week)
- (IS) has no premises; **initial sequences** start derivations
- (MR): monotonicity rule
- (\wedge 1), (\neg 1), (\neg 2) have two premises;
(\wedge 2) has two conclusions \rightsquigarrow is actually 2 rules

Using the calculus

- **Derivation** = finite sequence S_0, \dots, S_n of sequents where every S_i is either
 - an initial sequent or
 - is obtained by applying some basic rule to elements from S_0, \dots, S_{i-1}
- α is **derivable** from X , written $X \vdash \alpha$, if there is a derivation with $S_n = X \vdash \alpha$.

Examples

1	α	$\vdash \alpha$	(IS)	
2	α, β	$\vdash \alpha$	(MR) 1	
3	β	$\vdash \beta$	(IS)	
4	α, β	$\vdash \beta$	(MR) 3	
5	α, β	$\vdash \alpha \wedge \beta$	(\wedge 1) 2, 4	$\Rightarrow \underline{\underline{\{\alpha, \beta\} \vdash \alpha \wedge \beta}}$

1	$p \wedge \neg p$	$\vdash p \wedge \neg p$	(IS)	
2	$p \wedge \neg p$	$\vdash p$	(\wedge 2) 1	
3	$p \wedge \neg p$	$\vdash \neg p$	(\wedge 2) 1	
4	$p \wedge \neg p$	$\vdash \neg(p \wedge \neg p)$	(\neg 1) 2, 3	
5	$\neg(p \wedge \neg p)$	$\vdash \neg(p \wedge \neg p)$	(IS)	
6	\emptyset	$\vdash \neg(p \wedge \neg p)$	(\neg 2) 4, 5	$\Rightarrow \underline{\underline{\vdash \top}}$

Derivable rules

- Derivations can be long (see exercise sheet)
- Use derivable rules as “shortcuts”
for frequently occurring patterns in derivations
- Examples:

$\frac{X, \neg\alpha \vdash \alpha}{X \vdash \alpha}$	1	α	$\vdash \alpha$	(IS)
	2	X, α	$\vdash \alpha$	(MR) 1
	3	$X, \neg\alpha$	$\vdash \alpha$	supposition
\neg -elimination	4	X	$\vdash \alpha$	(\neg 2)

$\frac{X, \neg\alpha \vdash \beta, \neg\beta}{X \vdash \alpha}$	1	$X, \neg\alpha$	$\vdash \beta, \neg\beta$	supposition
	2	$X, \neg\alpha$	$\vdash \alpha$	(\neg 1)
reductio ad absurdum	3	X	$\vdash \alpha$	\neg -elimination 2

Further derivable rules

$$\frac{X \vdash \alpha \mid X, \alpha \vdash \beta}{X \vdash \beta} \quad \text{cut rule}$$

$$\frac{X \vdash \alpha \rightarrow \beta}{X, \alpha \vdash \beta} \quad \rightarrow\text{-elimination}$$

$$\frac{X, \alpha \vdash \beta}{X \vdash \alpha \rightarrow \beta} \quad \rightarrow\text{-introduction} \quad \text{syntactic deduction theorem}$$

$$\frac{X \vdash \alpha, \alpha \rightarrow \beta}{X \vdash \beta} \quad \text{detachment rule} \quad \text{syntactic } \textit{modus ponens}$$

Relation between \vdash and \models

- Goal: show $\vdash = \models$, i.e., $X \vdash \alpha$ iff $X \models \alpha$ for all X, α
- Direction \subseteq or \Rightarrow : (semantical) soundness of \vdash
(each formula derivable from X is a semantic consequence of X)
- Direction \supseteq or \Leftarrow : (semantical) completeness of \vdash
(each semantic consequence of X can be derived from X)

Soundness is the easier direction ...

Theorem (Soundness of \vdash)

\vdash is semantically sound, i.e., $\forall X, \alpha : X \vdash \alpha \Rightarrow X \models \alpha$

Proof.

Let $X \vdash \alpha$. $\Rightarrow \exists$ valid derivation S_1, \dots, S_n with $S_n = X \vdash \alpha$.

Induction on n .

- $n = 1$. $\Rightarrow S_1 = \alpha \vdash \alpha$, and $\alpha \models \alpha$ obviously holds.
- $n \rightsquigarrow n + 1$. Consider S_{n+1} in S_1, \dots, S_{n+1} .
 - Either $S_{n+1} = \alpha \vdash \alpha$ (then argue as for $n = 1$)
 - or S_{n+1} is obtained by applying some rule, e.g., $\frac{S_i = X' \vdash \alpha'}{S_{n+1} = X \vdash \alpha}$
 - induction hypothesis: $X' \models \alpha'$
 - since rules preserve the consequence relation (see exercise), we can conclude $X \models \alpha$

□

Finiteness

Another property that can be proven using induction on derivation length:

Theorem (Finiteness theorem for \vdash)

If $X \vdash \alpha$, then there is a finite subset $X_0 \subseteq X$ with $X_0 \vdash \alpha$.

Intuitive justification:

Every derivation has finite length

\Rightarrow Only finitely many formulas can “accumulate” in X during a derivation

Formal consistency

- ... is a property crucial to the completeness proof
- ... will turn out to be the \vdash -equivalent of satisfiability

Definition:

- Set X of fmas is **inconsistent** if $X \vdash \alpha$ for all fmas α , **consistent** otherwise.
- X is **maximally consistent** if X is consistent but each $Y \supseteq X$ is inconsistent

Observations:

- X inconsistent iff $X \vdash \perp$
(for " \Leftarrow " use $\perp = (p \wedge \neg p)$ and rules $(\wedge 2)$, $(\neg 1)$)

\rightsquigarrow X maximally consistent iff $\forall \alpha : \text{either } \alpha \in X \text{ or } \neg \alpha \in X$

Helpful properties of \vdash

Lemma

The derivability relation \vdash has the following properties.

$$C^+ : X \vdash \alpha \text{ iff } X, \neg\alpha \vdash \perp \qquad C^- : X \vdash \neg\alpha \text{ iff } X, \alpha \vdash \perp$$

Proof: [Exercise](#).

This lemma helps with our goal of showing $\models \subseteq \vdash$:

- “ $\models \subseteq \vdash$ ” iff $\forall X, \alpha : X \not\models \alpha \Rightarrow X \not\vdash \alpha$
- By C^+ , $X \not\models \alpha$ iff $X' := X \cup \{\neg\alpha\}$ is consistent
- By definition of \models , $X \not\models \alpha$ iff X' satisfiable

\Rightarrow Suffices to show: consistent sets are satisfiable

Consistent sets are satisfiable (I)

Lemma (Lindenbaum's lemma)

Every consistent set $X \subseteq \mathcal{F}$

can be extended to a maximally consistent set $X' \supseteq X$.

(Adolf Lindenbaum, 1904–1941, Polish logician/mathematician, Warsaw)

Proof sketch:

- Enumerate all formulas $\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \dots$
- For every $i = 0, 1, \dots$:
if $X \cup \{\alpha_i\}$ is consistent, then add α_i to X .
- X' is the limit of this extension procedure

Consistent sets are satisfiable (II)

Lemma (\neg)

For every maximally consistent set $X \subseteq \mathcal{F}$ and every $\alpha \in \mathcal{F}$:

$$X \vdash \neg\alpha \text{ iff } X \not\vdash \alpha \quad (\neg)$$

Proof.

“ \Rightarrow ” Due to consistency of X .

“ \Leftarrow ” If $X \not\vdash \alpha$, then $X, \neg\alpha$ is consistent due to \mathcal{C}^+ .

Since X is max. consistent, this implies $\neg\alpha \in X$.

Hence $X \vdash \neg\alpha$.

□

Consistent sets are satisfiable (III)

Lemma

Every maximally consistent set X is satisfiable.

Proof. Define valuation w by: $w \models p$ iff $X \vdash p$

Show by induction $\forall \alpha : X \vdash \alpha$ iff $w \models \alpha$.

(This implies $w \models X$, which completes the proof.)

- Base case ($\alpha = p$) follows from definition of w .
- Induction step for \wedge, \neg :

$$\begin{aligned} X \vdash \alpha \wedge \beta &\Leftrightarrow X \vdash \alpha, \beta && \text{(rules } (\wedge 1), (\wedge 2)) \\ &\Leftrightarrow w \models \alpha, \beta && \text{(induction hypothesis)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow w \models \alpha \wedge \beta && \text{(definition } \models) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} X \vdash \neg \alpha &\Leftrightarrow X \not\vdash \alpha && \text{(lemma } (\neg)) \\ &\Leftrightarrow w \not\models \alpha && \text{(induction hypothesis)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow w \models \neg \alpha && \text{(definition } \models) \end{aligned}$$

□

Completeness!

Theorem (Completeness of \vdash)

\vdash is semantically complete, i.e., $\forall X, \alpha : X \models \alpha \Rightarrow X \vdash \alpha$

Proof. Via contraposition.

- Assume $X \not\vdash \alpha$.
- Then $X, \neg\alpha$ is consistent.
- Due to Lindenbaum's lemma:
there is maximally consistent extension Y of $X, \neg\alpha$.
- Due to previous lemma: Y satisfiable
- Hence $X, \neg\alpha$ satisfiable.
- Therefore $X \not\models \alpha$.

□

Interesting consequences of soundness + completeness

Theorem (Finiteness theorem for \models)


If $X \models \alpha$, then there is a finite subset $X_0 \subseteq X$ with $X_0 \models \alpha$.

Follows directly from finiteness theorem for \vdash
and soundness + completeness of \vdash .

Theorem (Propositional compactness theorem)

$X \subseteq \mathcal{F}$ is satisfiable iff each finite subset of X is satisfiable.

Follows directly from finiteness theorem for \vdash with the observation
that X unsatisfiable iff $X \models \perp$.



And so, Arthur and Bedevere and Sir Robin set out on their search to find the enchanter of whom the old man had spoken in scene twenty-four. Beyond the forest, they met Launcelot and Galahad, and there was much rejoicing. In the frozen land of Nador, they were forced to eat Robin's minstrels.

And there was much rejoicing.

A year passed. Winter changed into Spring.

Spring changed into Summer.

Summer changed back into Winter, and Winter gave Spring and Summer a miss and went straight on into Autumn.

Until one day . . .

(from "Monty Python and the Holy Grail", 1975)

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Hilbert calculi . . .

- are very simple logical calculi
- are based on arbitrary choice of logical tautologies as *axioms*
- use rules of inference to prove other tautologies from the axioms
- lead to more intuitive proofs than sequent calculi

(David Hilbert, 1862–1943, German mathematician, Königsberg, GÖ)

A standard Hilbert calculus

- Logical signature: \neg, \wedge
(use $\alpha \rightarrow \beta$ as abbreviation for $\neg(\alpha \wedge \neg\beta)$)
- Set Λ of axioms: (5 schemes $\hat{=}$ infinitely many axioms)

$$\Lambda 1 \quad (\alpha \rightarrow \beta \rightarrow \gamma) \rightarrow (\alpha \rightarrow \beta) \rightarrow \alpha \rightarrow \gamma$$

$$\Lambda 2 \quad \alpha \rightarrow (\beta \rightarrow \alpha \wedge \beta)$$

$$\Lambda 3 \quad (\alpha \wedge \beta) \rightarrow \alpha$$

$$(\alpha \wedge \beta) \rightarrow \beta$$

$$\Lambda 4 \quad (\alpha \rightarrow \neg\beta) \rightarrow \beta \rightarrow \neg\alpha$$

- Only one inference rule! **Modus ponens:**

$$\text{MP} \quad \frac{X \vdash \alpha, \alpha \rightarrow \beta}{X \vdash \beta}$$

(whenever α and $\alpha \rightarrow \beta$ are provable from X , then so is β)

Using the calculus

- **Proof from X** = finite sequence $\varphi_0, \dots, \varphi_n$ of formulas where every φ_i is either
 - from $X \cup \Lambda$ or
 - is obtained by applying MP to two elements from $\varphi_0, \dots, \varphi_{i-1}$
- α is **provable** from X , written $X \vdash \alpha$, if there is a proof from X with $\varphi_n = \alpha$.

Example

Proof of $X = \{p, q\} \vdash p \wedge q$

1	p	X
2	q	X
3	$p \rightarrow (q \rightarrow p \wedge q)$	$\wedge 2$
4	$q \rightarrow p \wedge q$	MP 1, 3
5	$p \wedge q$	MP 2, 4

Proof of $\vdash \alpha \rightarrow (\beta \rightarrow \alpha)$

1	$\beta \wedge \neg \alpha \rightarrow \neg \alpha$	$\wedge 3$
2	$(\beta \wedge \neg \alpha \rightarrow \neg \alpha) \rightarrow (\alpha \rightarrow \neg(\beta \wedge \neg \alpha))$	$\wedge 4$
3	$\alpha \rightarrow \underbrace{\neg(\beta \wedge \neg \alpha)}_{\beta \rightarrow \alpha}$	MP 1, 2

Soundness

Theorem (Soundness of \vdash)

\vdash is semantically sound, i.e., $\forall X, \alpha : X \vdash \alpha \Rightarrow X \models \alpha$

This is immediate to see:

- All axioms in Λ are tautologies (use truth tables).
- MP *preserves* tautologies, i.e.:
if α and $\alpha \rightarrow \beta$ are tautologies, then so is β .

Hence every formula generated in a proof is a tautology.

Completeness

Theorem (Completeness of \vdash)

\vdash is semantically complete, i.e., $\forall X, \alpha : X \models \alpha \Rightarrow X \vdash \alpha$

Proof uses the completeness of \vdash :

- \vdash satisfies all basic rules of \vdash

$$\text{e.g., } (\wedge 2) \frac{X \vdash \alpha \wedge \beta}{X \vdash \alpha, \beta} \quad \text{also holds for } \vdash: \frac{X \vdash \alpha \wedge \beta}{X \vdash \alpha, \beta}$$

(to see this, use $\wedge 3$ and MP)

- Therefore, $\vdash \subseteq \vdash$
- Since $\vdash = \models$, we obtain $\models \subseteq \vdash$

Hence every formula generated in a proof is a tautology.

Summary and outlook

- Prop. logic (PL) relies on the principles of bivalence and extensionality.
- PL formulas **represent** exactly the Boolean functions.
- Logical **validity** and **consequence** are defined via the \models relation, based on valuations.
- **Natural deduction** (Gentzen-type sequent calculi) and **Hilbert calculi** both calculate the \models relation syntactically.
- We haven't captured other types of calculi, such as **tableau calculi** or the **resolution calculus**.

Literature

Contents is taken from Chapter 1 of

W. Rautenberg:

A Concise Introduction to Mathematical Logic, Springer, 2010.

- This issue at Universitext: [▶ DOI 10.1007/978-1-4419-1221-3_1](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-1221-3_1)
- German version of 2008: [▶ DOI 10.1007/978-3-8348-9530-1](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8348-9530-1)
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